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I. INTRODUCTION
Bailout opacity allows for multiple narratives. There is the
'popular' version, in which the Treasury's hotly debated' and heavily
scrutinized 2 $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program3 allowed a
handful of 'bailed out' AIG executives to pocket $165 million in bonus
payments.4 There is also the 'skeptics' version, in which the $170
billion injected into AIG was really a 'backdoor bailout' 5 of belatedly 6
disclosed 7 counterparties who continue to make big gambles and profit
handsomely 8 while tapping a multi-trillion dollar, self-administered 9
1. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. H10119-27 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2008); Deborah
Solomon & Michael R. Crittenden, Paulson Debates Second Infusion-Hostile
Lawmakers, Competing Bailout Demands and GAO Criticism Pose Dilemma, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 3, 2008, at A4.
2. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL FOR ECONOMIC STABILIZATION,
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE $700 BILLION EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION FUNDS:
THE FIRST REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL FOR ECONOMIC
STABILIZATION 6 (Dec. 10, 2008), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
121008-report.pdf (asking "who got the money, what have they done with it, how has it
helped the country, and how has it helped ordinary people").
3. This is the infamous Troubled Asset Relief Program, dubbed "TARP."
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008).
4. See, e.g., Michael W. Phillips, Outrage Overflows on Capitol Hill as
Lawmakers Denounce Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at A4.
5. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG COUNTERPARTIES
2 (Nov. 17, 2009) [hereinafter SIGTARP].
6. See The Real AIG Outrage, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2009, at A14 (pointing out
the real outrage is "the five-month Beltway cover-up over who benefited most from the
AIG bailout," including banks such as SocGen and Goldman Sachs); Dean Starkman,
Editorial, Goldman's Backdoor Bailout: A Call for Transparency in the Taxpayer
Rescue of Wall Street, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.cjr.org/
the audit/goldmansbackdoorbailout.php; Dean Starkman, Editorial, Goldman's Risk:
Somewhere Between Zero and $20 Billion, Contradictory NYT, Bloomberg Stories
Show Need for Bailout Transparency, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Oct. 29, 2008,
http://www.cjr.org/the-audit/goldmans_=risksomewherebetwee.php?page= 1.
7. AIG, AIG Discloses Counterparties to CDS, GIA and Securities Lending
Transactions: Attachments A-D (Mar. 15, 2009), available at http://www.aig.com/
aigweb/intemet/en/files/CounterpartyAttachments031809_tcm385-155645.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Graham Bowley, With Big Profit, Goldman Sees Big Payday Ahead,
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Federal Reserve System1° ("Fed" or "the Fed") I' slush fund. In the
official version, determined public servants at the Fed and Treasury
implemented and diligently managed necessary financial rescue
programs' 2 to facilitate economic recovery 3 and eventually earn
taxpayers a 'profit' 4 on their investment. Each of these variants is plau-
sible without meaningful disclosure from the Fed.
The bailout enigma is largely attributable to the trillions of dollars
the Fed lent through 'special credit and liquidity facilities' ("SCLF")'
5
without disclosing any information about the borrowers. The Fed,' 6 a
peculiar creation of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act ("FRA"),' 7 is
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at Al; Christine Harper, Goldman Sachs Boosts Risk-Taking
at Fastest Pace on Wall Street, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 26, 2009.
9. See, e.g., Kambiz Foroohar & Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam, BlackRock Is Go-To
Firm To Divine Wall Street Assets, BLOOMBERG, May 8, 2009, http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=a6TJmW9R44yc; Neil Irwin, At N.Y
Fed, Blending in Is Part of the Job, WASH. POST, July 20, 2009, at Al; Kate Kelly &
Jon Hilsenrath, New York Fed Chairman's Ties to Goldman Raise Questions, WALL ST.
J., May 4, 2009, at Al.
10. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
11. When people use the term "the Fed," they generally do not intend to distinguish
between the Board and the Federal Reserve Banks. Compare infra note 25 (describing
Federal Reserve Board), with infra note 21 (describing Federal Reserve Banks). On
occasion, people use the terms interchangeably. In this Note, "the Fed" refers to the
entire Federal Reserve System and will not be used when the distinction between the
Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Reserve Board is essential to understanding the
issue discussed.
12. DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE'S WAR ON THE GREAT
PANiC 217-41 (2009); David Cho & Michael D. Shear, How the Fed Failed to Tell
Obama About the Bonuses, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2009, at A 1; Randall Smith & Liam
Pleven, Some Will Pay Back AIG Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at Al.
13. David Wessel, Inside Dr. Bernanke's E.R., WALL ST. J., July 24, 2009, at D1
(quoting Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben S. Bernanke saying "I care about Wall
Street for one reason and one reason only: because what happens on Wall Street matters
to Main Street.").
14. Zachery Kouwe, As Banks Repay Bailout Money, U.S. Sees a Profit, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2009, at Al.
15. See infra note 23 (detailing the mechanics of the "discount window," the most
well-established SCLF); notes 26 and 32 and accompanying text (describing the
temporary SCLF established to combat the financial crisis).
16. The Federal Reserve System is principally comprised of: (1) twelve Reserve
Banks, (2) a seven-member Board of Governors, and (3) the Federal Open Market
Committee ("FOMC"). See infra notes 21 and 25 and accompanying text.
17. Fed. Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913).
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responsible for carrying out the nation's 'monetary policy." 18 Under the
FRA, the twelve' 9 federally chartered20 Federal Reserve Banks
("Reserve Banks")2 1 have the statutory authority22 to make 'discount
18. Monetary policy functions are intended "to improve financial or credit
conditions broadly." Joint Press Release, Federal Reserve Bank and the Treasury, The
Role of the Federal Reserve in Preserving Financial and Monetary Stability Joint
Statement by the Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve para. 2 (Mar. 23,
2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/
20090323b.htm [hereinafter Joint Statement] (explaining monetary policy in very
general terms). The Fed's "monetary policy" is implemented through its power to
regulate the money supply; the U.S. dollar is an instrument of "fiat money" not tied to a
commodity such as gold; and interest rates. See GEORGE B. GREY, FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM: BACKGROUND, ANALYSES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 17-41 (Susan Boriotti & Donna
Dennis eds., Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2002). See generally Robert L. Hetzel,
Henry Thornton: Seminal Monetary Theorist and Father of the Modern Central Bank,
73(4) ECON. REV. (1987) (explaining role of the central bank).
19. They are located in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Richmond, Cleveland,
Chicago, Atlanta, Dallas, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Kansas City, and San Francisco.
20. 12 U.S.C. § 341 (2006). Unlike any normal corporation, which should operate
for the profit of its shareholders, for example, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668.
(Mich. 1919), the Reserve Banks are not operated for profit and return their profits to
the U.S. Treasury, to the extent they exceed the Reserve Bank's expenses. 12 U.S.C. §
289(b)(1) (2006); 12 U.S.C. § 290 (2006); see GREY, supra note 18, at 3. This
characteristic alone significantly undercuts any notion the Reserve Banks are truly
independent from the Board or the federal government.
21. The main monetary policy functions of the Reserve Banks are: (1) supporting
and participating in the process of policy formulation through the Reserve Banks' (a)
minority of seats (5 of 12) on the and Federal Open Market Committee ("FOMC"), 12
U.S.C. § 263(a) (2006) (creating the FOMC), and (b) analysis and research, GREY,
supra note 18, at 2 (explaining Reserve Banks employ their own researchers and
economists to gather and analyze a wide range of economic data and to interpret
conditions and developments in the economy); (2) implementation of Board and FOMC
directives through Reserve Bank (a) lending, 12 U.S.C. §§ 301, 343, 347b(a) (2006), (b)
and administration of FOMC open market operations, 12 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)
(authorizing the Reserve Banks, at the behest of the FOMC, to buy certain debt in the
open market). Each Reserve Bank is controlled by a board of directors comprised of
nine people who serve terms of three-years. Three of the directors are appointed by the
Board to represent the public and the Reserve Bank's "member banks" elect the
remaining six. Of the directors selected by reserve bank members, each member
receives one vote regardless of the number of shares it holds. Directors are placed into
one of three "classes," according to institutional size; each class is eligible to elect one
director to represent the interests of the class and another to represent the public. FED.
RES. BANK OF N.Y., 2007 ANN. REP. 19 (2007). See GREY, supra note 18, at 5-6.
22. 12 U.S.C. §§ 301, 343, 347b(a) (2006). The Federal Reserve Act "vests
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window' 23 advances to any member bank 24 under rules and regulations
prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
("Board"). 25 In "unusual and exigent circumstances" the Board can ex-
ercise its FRA § 13(3) ("§ 13(3)") power 26 to "authorize ' 27 Reserve
Bank lending to "any individual, partnership, or corporation .... unable
to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking
[discount window] lending authority in the Reserve Banks, and the power to supervise
[the discount window] lending in the Board." Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 41, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 08 Civ. 9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum of
Points and Authorities].
23. These discount window loans are classified as either primary credit, "a backup
source of funding to a depository institution that is in generally sound financial
condition," 12 C.F.R. § 201.4(a) (2009), or secondary credit, a short-term basis backup
source of funding to a depository institution ineligible for primary credit. 12 C.F.R. §
201.4(b) (2009). Only depository institutions can borrow from the discount window. 12
C.F.R. § 201.2(c)(1) (2009).
24. Fed member banks include all national banks, 12 U.S.C. § 282 (2006), and
approved state-chartered banks, 12 U.S.C. § 321 (2006), which own nonvoting shares,
12 U.S.C. § 285 (2006), in their region's Reserve Bank. See generally FED. RES. BANK
OF N.Y., 2007 ANN. REP. 19, 27 (2007).
25. The Board is an "independent federal agency" responsible for the formulation
of monetary policy and supervision of the reserve banks. FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
2007 ANN. REP. 19 (2007). The Board's seven President-appointed and Senate-
confirmed Governors serve 14-year terms office, 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006), and meet
several times per week, see for example GREY, supra note 18, at 2-3, to facilitate the
Board's oversight of monetary policy by: (1) Board Governors' control of seven of the
twelve seats on the FOMC, 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (2006); (2) setting Fed member bank
reserve requirements, Fed. Reserve Bank, Reserve Requirements, http://
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2009)
(explaining "[r]eserve requirements are the amount of funds that a depository institution
must hold in reserve against specified deposit liabilities"); but see MURRAY N.
ROTHBARD, THE MYSTERY OF BANKING 94-103 (2008), available at http://
www.mises.org/mysteryofbanking/mysteryofbanking.pdf (critiquing this system of
bank reserves as inflationary and ephemeral); prescribing rules and regulations for
Reserve Bank lending, 12 U.S.C. § 353 (2006); and (3) supervising transactions with
foreign banks. 12 U.S.C. § 348a (2006) (stating the Board "shall exercise special
supervision over all relationships and transactions of any kind entered into by any []
reserve bank with any foreign bank or banker, or with any group of foreign banks or
bankers, and all such relationships and transactions shall be subject to such regulations,
conditions, and limitations as the Board may prescribe").
26. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). The Section 13(3) the lending "shall be subject to such
limitations, restrictions, and regulations as the [Board] may prescribe." Id.
27. Id. Through the "'affirmative vote' of at least five" Board Governors. Id.
2009
264 FORDHAMJOURNAL Vol. XV
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
institutions., 28 As the relative calm of August 200829 abruptly gave way
to the panic of 'searing September' with the collapse of Lehman
Brothers and AIG,3 ° the Fed's balance sheet ballooned. It expanded
from $910 million in August 2008 to $2.08 trillion dollars a year later.3
Nearly all of this expansion is attributable to SCLF lending.32 The Fed's
28. The Reserve Bank "shall obtain evidence" the Section 13(3) borrower's
inability to borrow. Also, this borrowing must also be "secured to the satisfaction of the
Reserve Bank.... Id.
29. The financial crisis began in earnest in Fall 2007, when two Bear Stearns hedge
funds which invested heavily in subprime mortgages collapsed. The Treasury
Department urged major financial institutions to take measures to address the situation.
When Bear Steams collapsed in March 2008, and the Fed and Treasury backstopped
J.P. Morgan's acquisition of the failed investment bank liquidity dried up temporarily.
During the summer of 2008, skyrocketing oil prices jolted the economy. James
Stewart, Eight Days; the Battle to Save the American Financial System, NEW YORKER,
Sept. 21, 2009, at 59.
30. This is when the global financial crisis accelerated with the collapse of Lehman
Brothers and the bailout of AIG. See, e.g., Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take
Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1.
31. Compare Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Condition Statement of Federal
Reserve Banks, H.4.1 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/h4l/20080828/, with Aug. 27, 2009 Release, available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h4l/20090827/.
32. "[E]levated pressures in short-term funding markets" in December 2007
prompted the Board to approve the Term Auction Facility ("TAF"). Press Release,
Federal Reserve Bank, Federal Reserve and Other Central Banks Announce Measures
Designed to Address Elevated Pressures in Short-Term Funding Markets (Dec. 12,
2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/20071212a.htm.
The TAF was the first in a series of new SCLFs the Board introduced to augment the
Discount Window and creatively provide financial institutions-as likely to hold debt
securities as more traditional assets like loans in today's economy-with needed
liquidity. C.f id. "Experience gained under this temporary program will be helpful in
assessing the potential usefulness of augmenting the [Fed's] current monetary policy
tools--open market operations and the primary [discount window] credit facility-with
a permanent facility for auctioning term discount window credit." Id. Through the
TAF, the Fed "auctioned" credit for between 28 and 84 days to depository institutions
eligible for primary credit at the Discount Window. Federal Reserve Bank, Term
Auction Facility Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/taffaq.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2009). "By allowing the Fed to inject
term funds through a broader range of counterparties and against a broader range of
collateral than open market operations [focused on Treasury bonds], this facility could
help promote the efficient dissemination of liquidity when the unsecured interbank
markets are under stress." See Press Release, Federal Reserve Bank, supra.
Similar initiatives followed and were directed at institutions which traditionally lacked
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practice is not to reveal any information about its SCLF borrowers'
identity, collateral, terms, rates or other information.33
To protect this secrecy, the Fed vociferously resists34 any attempts
to compel disclosure through legislation35 or litigation. The Senate
passed legislation by a vote of 96 to 2 in April 200936 which required
publication of some key information37 "with respect to all lending and
access to Fed credit-seventeen "primary dealers." See infra note 48 and
accompanying text (defining and identifying "primary dealers"). The Term Asset-
Backed Securities Loan Facility ("TALF") "supports the issuance of' asset-backed
securities (ABS) collateralized by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans and loans
guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA). The Primary Dealer Credit
Facility ("PDCF") allowed the dealers to secure loans with illiquid collateral. "The
PDCF was created as a temporary emergency measure." Declaration of Susan
McLaughlin at 10, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No.
08 Civ. 9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
24, 2009) [hereinafter McLaughlin Declaration]. Apparently relying on the structure
laid out in Section 13(3), PDCF "loans are processed through a clearing bank's
systems," not the New York Fed. The New York Fed determines the eligible collateral
while the clearing bank, using a variety of third-party pricing services and dealer prices,
actually values the collateral. Id. at 4-5 11. Through the Commercial Paper Funding
Facility ("CPFF") the New York Fed finances the purchase of highly-rated unsecured
and asset-backed commercial paper from eligible issuers via eligible primary dealers.
Donald S. Bernstein, Financial Crisis Fallout: Legislative and Regulatory Action 13-14
(Apr. 2009) (unpublished report prepared by Davis Polk & Wardwell, Third Circuit
Judicial Conference) (on file with author). Finally, there is the TSLF. See infra note 47
and accompanying text. The Fed also lends, on a non-recourse basis, "to eligible
institutions" which purchase high-quality asset-backed commercial paper from money
market mutual funds through the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility ("AMLF"). See Bernstein, supra at 13.
33. See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 22, at 20.
34. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Independence: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on
Domestic Monetary Policy and Tech., Comm. on Fin. Serv., 11 lth Cong. (July 9, 2009)
(statement of Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bank) (transcript available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/kohn2009O7O9a.htm) (arguing
"the process of vetting ideas and proposals, many of which are never incorporated into
policy decisions, could suffer from the threat of public disclosure").
35. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Transparency Act, S. 513, 111th Cong. (2009)
(requiring disclosure of Section 13(3) SCLF borrowers' identities, type and terms of
loan, value, collateral and rationale for the loan).
36. 155 CONG. REC. S4223-24 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2009) (S. Amend. 913 to S. Con.
Res. 13 § 2(A) (amending S. Con. Res. 13 at § 215); S. Con. Res. 13, tit. 2 § 215
(setting forth the congressional budget for the United States Government for fiscal year
2010)).
37. The statute provided, in pertinent part:
(A) the nature and amounts of the collateral that the central bank is accepting on
2009
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financial assistance facilities" created by the Board "to address the
financial crisis .... 38 The first required disclosure under the
legislation,39 in a June 10, 2009 Board-issued report,40 suggests the
Board continues to avoid the spirit of the April 2009 disclosure
provisions. For example, the report conveniently omitted from the
'portfolio composition' by 'credit rating' 4' two-thirds of the assets 42
held by the entity comprising assets the Fed guaranteed 43 in the March
2008 bailout of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.'s acquisition of investment
bank Bear Steams. 44 In an even more flagrant example of non-revelatory
disclosure, the reported "par45 value of securities lent' 46 through the
behalf of American taxpayers in the various lending programs, on no less than a
monthly basis; (B) the extent to which changes in valuation of credit extensions to [to
entities holding former Bear Steams and AIG assets in] ... are a result of losses on
collateral which will not be recovered; (C) the number of borrowers that participate in
each of the lending programs and details of the credit extended, including the extent to
which the credit is concentrated in one or more institutions; and (D) information on
the extent to which the central bank is contracting for services of private sector firms
for the design, pricing, management, and accounting for the various lending programs
and the terms and nature of such contracts and bidding processes.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. The Board presented it differently, however, describing its efforts to
provide "considerable new information on [Fed] credit and liquidity programs." Press
Release, Federal Reserve Bank, Federal Reserve Issues First Monthly Report on Its
Credit and Liquidity Programs (June 10, 2009), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090610a.htm.
40. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM MONTHLY REPORT ON CREDIT AND LIQUIDITY PROGRAMS AND THE BALANCE
SHEET, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/
monthlyclbsreport200906.pdf [hereinafter June 10 Report].
41. See id. at 13 tbl. 27.
42. This is by excluding "swaps and other derivative contracts, commercial and
residential mortgage loans, and to be announced (TBA) investments." Id. at 13 n. 1
accompanying tbl. 27. Such assets appear to make up, based on the collateralized
mortgage obligations and "other investments" category (defined, id. at n.2, as "all asset
sectors that, individually, represent less than 5 percent of aggregate portfolio fair
value"), approximately 67.6% of Maiden Lane's net assets. Compare id. at 13 tbl. 26
(detailing "Portfolio Composition"), with id. at 13 tbl. 27 (detailing "Asset Distribution
by Type and Rating").
43. "Maiden Lane LLC," id. at 13.
44. See, e.g., KATE KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS: THE LAST 72 HOURS OF BEAR
STEARNS, THE TOUGHEST FIRM ON WALL STREET 197-98 (Portfolio 2009).
45. Face or stated value.
46. June 10 Report, supra note 40, at 7 and accompanying tbl. 9.
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Fed's Term Securities Lending Facility ("TSLF") 47 to primary dealers, 48
in exchange for "all manner of lesser-quality paper" dealers could not
otherwise borrow against, 49 includes only the "portion of securities held
outright" when "[s]ecurities loans under the TSLF are off-balance-sheet
transactions. '  Not surprisingly, 84 percent of this selectively disclosed
TSLF lending is secured by the highest quality collateral.5 Attempts to
compel disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"),52
enacted to "facilitate public access to Government documents" 53 by
creating a "judicially enforceable public right to secure such information
from possibly unwilling official hands,"54  have been similarly
47. The TSLF and TSLF Options Program ("TOP") "promote liquidity in Treasury
and other collateral markets and thus foster the functioning of financial markets more
generally." See Bernstein, supra note 32, at 14.
48. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Primary Dealers List, http://www.new
yorkfed.org/markets/pridealerscurrent.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2009); Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, Administration of Relationships with Primary Dealers
(Jan. 22, 1992), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealerspolicies.html
(explaining what these primary dealers do for the New York Fed).
49. The TSLF program allows the dealers to "swap" these low quality debt
securities "in the market for ultra-liquid Treasury securities." Randall W. Forsyth,
Current Yield: Should the Fed Regulate Wall Street?, BARRON'S, Mar. 24, 2008, at
M15.
50. June 10 Report, supra note 40, at 1 and accompanying tbl. 1.
51. Id. at 9 tbl. 14. The calculation represents the portion of disclosed SCLF
lending secured by "U.S. Treasury, agency, and agency-backed securities" and AAA,
AA, and A rated securities. Id.
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
53. U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991); John Doe Agency v.
John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151 (1989); Associated Press v. U.S. Dep't of Defense,
554 F.3d 274, 283 (2d Cir. 2009); Lahr v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 973
(9th Cir. 2009); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FBI, 522 F.3d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2008);
Campaign for Responsible Transplantation v. FDA, 511 F.3d 187, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
Avondale Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 90 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1996); Davin v. DOJ, 60
F.3d 1043, 1049 (3d Cir. 1995); Forest Guardians v. FEMA, 410 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th
Cir. 2005); Ligorner v. Reno, 2 F. Supp. 2d 400, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
54. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151 (1989); Dep't of Air
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79-80
(1973)); Lahr v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2009); News-
Press v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 1173, 1190 (1 1th Cir. 2007); Judicial
Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 365 F.3d 1108, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Dickerson v. DOJ, 992 F.2d
1426, 1435 (6th Cir. 1993) (Batchelder, J., dissenting); Miller v. U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture, 13 F.3d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1993); Hale v. DOJ, 973 F.2d 894, 898 (10th
Cir. 1992); Bowers v. DOJ, 930 F.2d 350, 356 (4th Cir. 1991); Schell v. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 843 F.2d 933, 936 (6th Cir. 1988); LaRouche v. FBI, 677 F.2d
2009
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unsuccessful.
This is unsurprising, as the Fed has made every attempt to circ-
umvent the FOIA since its passage.5 The Board could and did close all
meetings dealing with bank regulation, monetary policy, or international
finance. The publicly released minutes of these meetings reveal few
specifics. Moreover, the Fed insisted that the Government in the
Sunshine Act,16 intended to open agency meetings to public scrutiny,"
did not apply58 to the "quasigovernmental" Federal Open Market
256, 258 (2d Cir. 1982); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir.
1974).
55. The Fed's behavior contravenes the Board's purported aversion to "dubious"
means of circumventing the FOIA. Arthur F. Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Address at the 1976 International Monetary Conference:
The Proper Limits of Openness in Government 18-19 (June 19, 1976) (transcript
available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/afb76/download/29508/Burns_
19760619.pdf ) (rejecting "circumvention as a suitable course for the Federal Reserve"
which "will have no part in any such dubious exercises"); see infra text accompanying
notes 58, 61, 63, 80; see also WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE
FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY 54-55 (Simon & Schuster 1989) (stating "[n]o
other agency of government, not even the Central Intelligence Agency, enjoyed [the
Boards] privacy").
56. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
552b (2006)).
57. The Sunshine Act was passed "to provide that meetings of multimember
Federal agencies shall be open to the public." H.R. REP. No. 94-880 (1976). It requires
"the deliberations of at least the number of individual agency members required to take
action," 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2) (2006), on behalf of an agency, see infra note 78 and
accompanying text (defining agency under the FOIA), "headed by a collegial body
composed of two or more individual members, a majority of whom are appointed to
such positions by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate," 5 U.S.C. §
552b(a)(1) (2006), to be conducted so "every portion of every meeting of an agency
shall be open to public observation." 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b) (2006). See generally F.C.C.
v. ITT World Commc'ns, 466 U.S. 463 (1984); NRDC v. NRC, 216 F.3d 1180 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); Jennifer A. Bensch, Seventeen Years Later: Has Government Let the Sun
Shine In, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1475 (1993); Kathy Bradley, Do You Feel the
Sunshine? Government in the Sunshine Act: Its Objectives, Goals, and Effect on the
FCC and You, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 473 (1997); James T. O'Reilly & Gracia M. Ber,
Stealth Caused by Sunshine: How Sunshine Act Interpretation Results in Less
Information for the Public About the Decision-Making Process of the International
Trade Commission, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 425 (1995).
58. The Board claimed the FOMC's inclusion of Reserve Bank presidents gave the
FOMC "special status that the measure's language did not cover." WYATT C. WELLS,
ECONOMIST IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: ARTHUR F. BURNS AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE,
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Committee ("FOMC").5 9 When litigation 60 threatened to compel the
disclosure of detailed, paraphrased minutes of FOMC meetings, then-
Board Chairman Arthur Bums seemingly abolished them in 1976. In
fact, "[d]espite years of denials the FOMC... recorded and transcribed
in complete detail every FOMC meeting since 1976.,,61 Thirty-two
years later, at the height of the 2008 financial panic, the composition of
the "four musketeers" who comprised current Board Chairman Ben
Bernanke's "core group" of decision-makers was driven by the desire to
meet without triggering the Sunshine Act's formal notice
requirements. 62 The Board also refused to disclose63 detailed records
about its dramatic recent SCLF lending 64 in response to FOIA
requests. 6' As things stand now, the public knows little about the
administration of SCLF funds or their recipients.
This Note will focus on recent litigation in which news
organizations sued the Board after it refused to disclose SCLF lending
1970-78 186 (1994).
59. See, e.g., FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., 2007 ANN. REP. 19 (2007) (explaining the
FOMC is responsible for establishing policy regarding and overseeing domestic open
market operations, while the Federal Reserve Bank of New York executes open market
transactions in accordance with FOMC authorizations and directives). See generally 12
U.S.C. §§ 348a, 353-59 (2006) (delineating powers of FOMC); Merrill v. Fed. Open
Market Comm. of Fed. Reserve Sys., 565 F.2d 778, 781 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(describing impact of open market operations).
60. See, e.g., Merrill, 565 F.2d at 781 n.4.
61. The FOMC voted to discontinue the release of a detailed memorandum of
discussion at its meetings on May 18, 1976. Letter from Henry Gonzalez, Chairman of
H. Comm. on Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs to Members of the Committee on
Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs (Jan. 27, 1994), reprinted in STAFF OF H. COMM. ON
BANKING, FINANCE & URBAN AFFAIRS, 103RD CONG., THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S 17-
YEAR SECRET 103-2 at v (Comm. Print 1994).
62. DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST 106-7 (2009). No more than three FRB
Governors can meet to consider action without formal notice. The fourth "musketeer,"
current Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, was then president of the New York Fed
and "didn't count" because he was not an FRB Governor. Id. at 107.
63. See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 22, at 20.
64. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 31.
65. See, e.g., Complaint of Bloomberg LP against the Federal Reserve Bank at
22, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 08 Civ. 9595
(LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009)
(seeking detailed information about securities posted as collateral to the Fed's Primary
Dealer Credit Facility ("Loan Request"); id. at 38 (seeking detailed information about
the collateral "supporting the loan extended by the Federal Reserve in connection with
the proposed acquisition of Bear Steams .... ).
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records in response to a FOIA request: Fox News Network, LLC v.
Board ("Fox")66 and Bloomberg L.P. v. Board ("Bloomberg").67 In both
of these cases the Board made three arguments: 1) Board SCLF records
are not 'agency records' subject to the FOIA; 2) Even if Board SCLF
records are within the FOIA's reach, they are exempt from the FOIA's
disclosure requirements 68 as 'confidential financial records' under ex-
emption four 69 or 3) 'inter or intra-agency deliberative material' under
exemption five. 70 This Note will analyze the facts, statutes and case law
applicable to each of the Board's arguments.
If the Bloomberg and Fox decisions are any indication, the question
of whether the Fed must disclose SCLF lending records under the FOIA
is a close one. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
judges Alvin K. Hellerstein, in Fox, and Loretta Preska, in Bloomberg,
reached different conclusions. Judge Hellerstein held that the SCLF
records at issue were not 'agency records,' but were 'confidential'
material 'obtained from a person.' Judge Hellerstein, however, ac-
knowledged that his decision raised the possibility that the public will
never obtain "any meaningful documents enabling a public accounting
of' 7' the Fed's SCLF lending. Judge Preska, who issued her Bloomberg
decision less than a month after Hellerstein's ruling in Fox, was not
persuaded by the Board's arguments. In fact, Judge Preska ordered the
Board to produce documents containing the names of borrowers, the
type of SCLF borrowed from, individual loan amounts and loan
origination and maturity dates. 72 She also ordered the Board to search
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York ("New York Fed")73 for Board
66. 639 F. Supp. 2d 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
67. No. 08 Civ. 9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2009 Supp.).
69. § 552(b)(4).
70. § 552(b)(5).
71. Fox News Network, 639 F. Supp. at 396.
72. Bloomberg, 2009 WL 2599336, at *17, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942, at **51-
52. These "Remaining Term Reports" did not identify the interest rates on the loans,
specific items of collateral pledged for the loans or the haircuts applied to the collateral,
or other information responsive to the news outlet's FOIA request. Id. Preska origin-
nally ordered the disclosure within five days, id., but the order was stayed pending
appeal. Stipulation and Order Staying Order of August 24, 2009, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 08 Civ. 9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942 (Aug. 24, 2009) (on file with author).
73. The New York Fed plays a particularly important role in the SCLF lending
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records.74 The issue is now before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
after the Board appealed75 Judge Preska's decision in Bloomberg and
consented to similar efforts by an "an association of leading financial
institutions ....76
The dispute over the Board's SCLF records will require the
appellate court to resolve between one and three questions. As the
Supreme Court explained in Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of Press ("Kissinger"),7 7 a federal court's jurisdiction to order
disclosure of material under the FOIA depends upon a showing that an
agency78 has (1) improperly; (2) withheld; (3) agency records. 79 Here,
program.
74. Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 08 Civ.
9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, at *17, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942, at **51-52
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009).
75. Mark Pittman, Federal Reserve Appeals Court Order to Disclose Loans,
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 30, 2009, www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&sid=aSab0xkcV8jc.
76. Memorandum of Law in Support of the Clearing House Association L.L.C.'s
Motion to Intervene at 1, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
No. 08 Civ. 9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Clearing House Intervention Memo]. This "association"
includes branches of four primary dealers. Compare id. at note 1 (listing organizations
who make up the clearinghouse challenging disclosure), with supra note 48 (listing
New York Fed primary dealers). The association's motion to intervene in the
Bloomberg case and appeal Preska's order, Clearing House Intervention Memo, supra
at 2, was granted by Preska. See Order Granting Clearing House Association's Motion,
No. 08 Civ. 9595 (LAP) (Sept. 17, 2009) (on file with author). The motion was filed
out of fear "the Board will [not] obtain such approval or, if necessary exhaust its
appellate remedies, including seeking Supreme Court review." Clearing House Inter-
vention Memo, supra at 3. Such fears may have been prompted by an effort to pressure
the President of the United States into declining the Board's request to the Solicitor
General, an executive branch official, for permission to pursue the appeal. See, e.g.,
Matthew Winkler, Transparency and the Fed, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2009, at A21
(arguing the decision belongs not to the Board but to the President of the United States
because "[a]ny appeal would have to be mounted by [Department of Justice's] Solicitor
General... who reports to [the] President ....
77. 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552(0(1) (2009 Supp.) (defining agency as "any executive
department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled
corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government
(including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory
agency"); Rushforth v. Council of Econ. Advisers, 762 F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (defining an agency for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006) with the § 552b(a)(1)
definition). The Board is an agency, supra note 25, and admits as much in litigation.
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the first and third prongs of the Kissinger requirements are at issue.80
First, a court must determine whether the disputed materials are
'agency records' subject to the FOIA. The Court articulated the pre-
vailing definition of 'agency records' under the FOIA in DOJ v. Tax
Analysts ("Tax Analysts"):81 Agency records must be created or obtained
by the agency 82 and within the control of the agency at the time of the
FOIA request. 83 Here, both of these requirements are at issue.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 22, at 34. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5)
(2006 & 2008 Supp.) (defining the term "independent regulatory agency" to include the
FRB within for purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13
§ 2, 109 Stat. 164) (1995); 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 686 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (including "Federal
Reserve" within its listing of independent regulatory agencies) (citing 44 U.S.C. §
3502(5) (2008 Supp.)); Albrecht v. Comm. on Employee Benefits of the Fed. Reserve
Employee Benefits Sys., 357 F.3d 62, 65-66 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (characterizing the Board
as a "governmental entity"); Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir.
1982); but c.f Research Triangle Inst. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, 132
F.3d 985, 989 (4th Cir. 1997) (concluding "money used to fund the [FRB] ... 'shall not
be construed to be Government funds or appropriated moneys"') (quoting 12 U.S.C. §
244 (2006))).
79. 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980).
80. The Board's court filings indicate material responsive to FOIA requests for
SCLF records are withheld. See, e.g., Declaration of Alison M. Thro at Exhibit 4 pp.
25-26,, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 08 Civ. 9595
(LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009)
[hereinafter Thro Declaration]; Declaration of Steven G. Mintz in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment at Attachment "Index of Withheld Material, Fox News FOIA
Request 2009-73," Fox News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 639 F. Supp. 2d 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter Mintz Declaration].
81. 492 U.S. 136 (1989).
82. Id. at 144. "The relevant issue is whether an agency covered by the FOIA has
created or obtained the materials sought, not whether the organization from which the
documents originated is itself covered by the FOIA." Id. at 146 (internal citations and
quotations omitted) (quoting Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 182 (1980)). The Court
noted this point was also "implicit" in the Court's holding in DOJ v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1,
7 & n.6 (1988), where "it was uncontroverted that presentence reports, which had been
prepared under district court auspices and turned over to the Department and the Parole
Commission, constituted 'agency records."' Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 146 n.7.
83. "By control," the Court explained, "we mean that the materials have come into
the agency's possession in the legitimate conduct of its official duties." Tax Analysts,
492 U.S. at 145. "The control inquiry focuses on an agency's possession of the
requested materials, not on its power to alter the content of the materials it receives."
Id. at 147.
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Next, if the disputed material satisfies the definition of 'agency
records,' the court must determine if an exemption to the FOIA applies.
"[U]nless the requested materials fall within one of the Act's
enumerated exemptions" the Supreme Court explained in Taylor v.
Sturgell ("Sturgell"),84 "the agency must 'make the records promptly
available' to the [FOIA] requester."85
Second, the Board asserts exemption four, which applies to: 1)
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information"; 2) "obtained
from a person"; and 3) "privileged or confidential., 8 6 Here, exemption
four's second and third elements are in dispute. Only "an individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization
other than an agency" is a person within the meaning of exemption
four.87 A submission is 'confidential' under exemption four if
disclosure "is likely to" either: 88 1) "impair the Government's ability to
84. 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2167 (2008) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (specifying exemptions
to FOIA disclosure requirements)).
85. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
87. 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (2006) (defining a person).
88. Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (articulating the (1) impairment prong and the (2) substantial harm prong); see
also Inner City Press/Community on Move v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
463 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining National Parks test to "determine whether
information is confidential for the purposes of Exemption 4"); Nadler v. FDIC, 92 F.3d
93, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing "two-part test" meant to determine "whether
information is 'privileged or confidential'); Cont'l Stock Transfer & Trust Co. v. SEC,
566 F.2d 373, 375 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam). In the D.C. Circuit, Critical Mass
Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc), subjects
voluntary submissions to a "less-demanding" standard. See Contract Freighters v. Sec'y
of U.S. Dep't of Transp., 260 F.3d 858, 862-63 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating as such); see
Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 885 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (lamenting, "[n]o longer is it
necessary to show in each case how disclosure will significantly harm some relevant
private or governmental interest" (internal quotations omitted)). Under Critical Mass, if
a voluntary submitter "would not customarily release [the information] to the public," it
is confidential under Exemption Four. Id. at 880. Even if the Critical Mass standard
applies, however, a mandatory submission remains subject to the "stringent" National
Parks standard. Contract Freighters, 260 F.3d at 862-63. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals has yet to decide whether to adopt Critical Mass and its standard. See Inner
City Press, 463 F.3d at 245 n.6; Nadler, 92 F.3d at 96 n.1. Here, the underlying dispute
centers around who provided the material at issue to the Board, rather than how (i.e.
voluntarily or compulsory) it was provided. See infra text accompanying note 294-96.
In any event, the records at issue here are logically submitted only on a compulsory
basis. SCLF borrowers must identify themselves and their collateral to secure a loan,
the Reserve Banks must keep records of this SCLF lending and the Board must monitor
2009
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obtain necessary information in the future'8 , or 2) "cause substantial
harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the
information was obtained." 90 The Board suggests there is also a third
basis for confidentiality, 'program effectiveness,' but the legal support
for such a proposition is scant. 91
Alternatively, the Board asserted exemption five, which the
appellate court will address if it holds that exemption four is inap-
plicable. Material qualifies under exemption five 92 if it meets each of
the following three core requirements: 1) it is either 93 a) inter-agency, or
b) intra-agency; 94 2) it is either a) memoranda, or b) letters; and it is 3)
it. Accordingly, this Note presumes the National Parks confidentiality standard applies
to this information submitted on a compulsory basis regardless of whether Critical
Mass controls voluntarily submitted information.
89. National Parks, 498 F. 2d at 770. "Generally, there is no impairment when the
government can compel disclosure of the information." Aguirre v. SEC, 551 F. Supp.
2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878); "When submissions are
compelled, the government's ability to procure information usually is not impaired
because a statute or other mandate ensures future compliance." N.Y. Pub. Interest
Research Group v. EPA, 249 F. Supp. 2d 327, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
90. National Parks, 498 F.2d at 770. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d
141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In this case the FDA required drug companies "to submit
volumes of information related to a drug's development, composition, safety, and
manufacture" pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006). Id. The court held the
"submission-dependent nature of the [drug] approval process means Exemption 4
extends to at least some information contained in" pharmaceutical applications. Id.
The court was concerned about the potential for an applicant's competitors to use
publicly disclosed application material to avoid the substantial investment of time and
effort the submitting company put into both the drug and the application. Competitors
could even "bring to market a product competitive with" the submitter's product. Id. at
148-49.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 328-70.
92. Exemption Five applies to "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation
with the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006 & 2009 Supp.).
93. Stewart v. U. S. Dep't of the Interior, 554 F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2009)
(stating requirement "a document must be the product of a government agency").
94. "[Tjhe most natural meaning of the phrase 'intra-agency memorandum' is a
memorandum that is addressed both to and from employees of a single agency." DOJ
v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 18, n.1 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (approvingly referenced in
U.S. Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 9
(2001)); Nat'l Inst. of Military Justice v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 512 F.3d 677, 683
(D.C. Cir.) (comments by non-governmental lawyers solicited by the Department of
Defense for their experience and qualifications were "intra-agency"), cert. denied, 129
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privileged in the civil discovery context 95 by virtue of the application of
a recognized privilege.96 All of these elements are potentially at issue
here, however this Note discusses only the closest question under
exemption five: the nature of the Board's exemption five 'monetary
policy' privilege.
Because an exemption four analysis is contingent upon a finding
that 'agency records' are at issue, and exemption five's temporary
exemption only applies if exemption four's permanent exemption does
not, this Note will evaluate the issues in the order laid out above. 97 The
first few issues discussed; 'agency records,' the evidentiary burden of
proof courts require to sustain agency withholding under FOIA
exemptions and the 'obtained from a person' requirement under the
FOIA's fourth exemption; are best described as threshold 'structural
arguments.' After careful analysis, this Note reveals the Board's
'agency records' and 'obtained from a person' arguments are unlikely to
prevail.
The Board's 'qualitative' arguments," such as confidentiality under
exemption four and the scope of the Board's privilege under exemption
five, present closer legal questions. The Board's argument the SCLF
records are 'confidential' under exemption four's 'substantial com-
petitive harm' prong is particularly compelling. The court will need to
determine whether the 'stigma' associated with borrowing from a Fed
SCLF puts (depending on the court's findings with respect to whether
the records are 'agency records' and 'obtained from a person') the
Reserve Bank or SCLF borrower at risk of 'substantial competitive
harm.' Both the Reserve Bank and some SCLF borrowers raise the
specter of debilitating bank runs "potentially destroying not merely the
[SCLF borrowing] institution's competitive position but its viability." 99
S. Ct. 775 (2008)).
95. United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 799-800 (1984); NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 148 (1975) ("Exemption 5 withholds from a
member of the public documents which a private party could not discover in litigation
with the agency.").
96. Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 473 F.3d 312, 321 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) ("Exemption 5 incorporates the traditional privileges that the Government
could assert in civil litigation against a private litigant.").
97. Contingent to the Federal Reserve Board carrying the same legal arguments on
its appeal as it did in the district court.
98. See infra notes 233-39 and accompanying text.
99. Clearing House Intervention Memo, supra note 76, at 13 (internal quotations
omitted); see id. at 3 & text accompanying n.235 (quoting Declaration of Brian F.
2009
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Yet if, as a former investment banker and hedge fund operator argued in
The Wall Street Journal recently, "[t]here is no longer a stigma
associated with borrowing from the Fed," 100 or "'the disclosure of
individual borrowers' names . . . would 'undermine the value of the
facilities that [the New York Fed is] providing,"' as New York Fed
President William Dudley stated in response to a question posed by this
Note's author,'0 ' the legal requirements to prove 'substantial
competitive harm' under exemption four are not met. Ultimately, this
Note concludes SCLF disclosure is compelled by the FOIA.
I. STRUCTURAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NON-DISCLOSURE
The records at issue concern accounting for specific Reserve Bank
credit extensions under the SCLF.10 2  This data is reported daily to
senior leadership at the Board and the New York Fed by the Board's
Monetary Affairs unit. It is obtained from "raw data provided to Board
staff on a daily basis by the Reserve Banks"'0 3 and distributed to "high
level" staff within the Board's Monetary Affairs unit and Reserve Bank
Operations and Payment Systems ("RBOPS").
The reports include the following: A) an "[o]rigination [r]eport' 0 4
detailing the previous business day's individual loans by"0 5 1) borrower,
Madigan at 14, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 08
Civ. 9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24,
2009) [hereinafter Madigan Declaration] (filed in support of FRB Summary Judgment
Memo)).
100. Ann Lee, The Banking System Is Still Broken, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2009, at
A17.
101. Michael S. Derby, Fed Dudley: Rates To Stay 'Exceptionally Low' for
Extended Period, Dow JONES NEWSWIRES, Oct. 5, 2009, available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20091005-715011.html; Scott Lanman & Michael
McKee, Fed's Dudley Signals Concern About Risks of Slower Inflation, BLOOMBERG,
Oct. 6, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ajJnMfOv
DIpw.
102. Mintz Declaration, supra note 80, at Attachment "Index of Withheld Material,
Fox News FOIA Request 2009-73."
103. Reserve Banks obtain this information from records of transactions with
borrowing institutions. Id.
104. Id.
105. This list is not exhaustive. Only the most important components of the report,
based on the author's judgment, are listed here. Id.
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2) individual loan amounts, and 3) maturity dates; 10 6 B) a "[r]emaining
[t]erm [r]eport"' 10 7 detailing 1) all loans by'0 8 a) borrower, b) amount and
c) origination and maturity date, and 2) aggregate credit'0 9 a)
outstanding, and b) maturing on a specific date; and 3) an "[e]mergency
[c]redit [r]eport"'10 detailing 1) individual a) borrowers b) loan amounts
c) maturity dates for each loan, and 2) aggregate a) emergency credit
outstanding and b) credit by type of facility.
It is apparent Board employees take raw Reserve Bank data and
distill it into a coherent picture of SCLF activity. The bulk of the
records at issue detail Reserve Bank §13(3) lending initiated by the
Board. In fact, the only lending the Reserve Banks can initiate inde-
pendently through the discount window comprises less than 10% of
known SCLF lending as of June 2009.1" In short, largely Board-
initiated activity carried out by the Reserve Banks is reported by the
Reserve Banks to the Board, where Board employees synthesize the
information and share it with Board and Reserve Bank employees.
These facts inform the court's analysis of three of the Board's
arguments: 'agency records,' 'obtained from a person' under exemption
four and the inter- or intra-agency requirement of exemption five.
A. Agaency Records
The Board claims that "Board records subject to FOIA" are limited
to "a very narrow category of documents located at the [Reserve
Banks]." ' 1 2  Specifically, the Board argues "the establishment and
administration of" the SCLF is "not a function 'performed for or on
behalf of the Board,"'. 3 as it says is required under its regulations
defining Board records. To arrive at this conclusion, the" Board con-
veniently relies on only one of two possible definitions of Board records
in its regulations: "[A]ll information coming into the possession and
106. Id. at 1-2.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Mintz Declaration, supra note 80, at Attachment "Index of Withheld Material,
Fox News FOIA Request 2009-73," at 2-3.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 3-4. These are Federal Reserve Act Section 13(3) facilities "administered
by the FRBNY" and include: PDCF, TSLF, AMLF, AIG, CPFF, and Bear Steams. Id.
at 4.
111. June 10 Report, supra note 40, at 1 tbl. 1.
112. Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 22, at 40.
113. Thro Declaration, supra note 80, at 21.
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under the control of ... any [Reserve Bank], or any officer, employee,
or agent of ... any [Reserve Bank]... in the performance of functions
for or on behalf of the [Board]." ' "4  From this regulation, the Board
"interprets the words 'for or on behalf of the Board' to mean 'under
delegated authority from the Board."" 15
1. Board's Regulations Defining 'Agency Records'
The Board regulations defining "Records of the Board" are-at
best-an unintelligible mess. 1 6  Reading the language naturally, a
nearly impossible task, the following definition of Board 'agency
records' under the Board regulation emerges: "[A]ll information"'' 7
within the Board's "official files"---defmed as "the Board's central
records"'l 8-falls under the Board regulation's separate definition of
"Records of the Board" 1 9 if "any [Reserve Bank], or any officer,
employee, or agent of. . . any Reserve Bank"'' 20 1) obtains it "in the
performance of functions for or on behalf of the Board; or"' 2' 2)
maintains it "for administrative reasons in the regular course of
business" at "any division or office of the [Board] or any [Reserve
Bank] in connection with the transaction of any official business."'' 22
This division reflects the most logical distinction between the two
114. 12 C.F.R. § 261.2(i)(1)(i) (2009).
115. Fox News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 639 F.
Supp. 2d 384, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal citations omitted); see Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, supra note 22, at 50.
116. 12 C.F.R. § 261.2 (i)(1) (2009) reads as follows:
Records of the Board include:
(i) In written form, or in nonwritten or machine-readable form; all information
coming into the possession and under the control of the Board, any Board member,
any Federal Reserve Bank, or any officer, employee, or agent of the Board or of any
Federal Reserve Bank, in the performance of functions for or on behalf of the Board
that constitute part of the Board's official files; or
(ii) That are maintained for administrative reasons in the regular course of business
in official files in any division or office of the Board or any Federal Reserve Bank in
connection with the transaction of any official business.
Id.
117. Id. § 261.2(i)(1)(i).
118. Id. §261.2(a).
119. Id. § 261.2(i)(1)).
120. Id. § 261.2(i)(1)(i)).
121. Id.
122. 12 C.F.R. § 261.2(i)(1)(ii) (2009).
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possible definitions: the first addresses the circumstances under which
the Fed received the information, and the second involves the reason the
Fed keeps the information. The term "central records" is undefined
within the "Definitions" portion 2 3  of the Board's regulations
prescribing "Rules Regarding Availability of Information."' 24
Ultimately, the Fox Court was persuaded "the [Board's] inter-
pretations of its own regulations are reasonable and consistent."' 125
Concluding that only Reserve Bank records reflecting a Reserve Bank's
exercise of a function delegated to the Reserve Bank by the Board are
Board records, 126 the Fox Court held "records of [Reserve Bank] lending
are not Board records"' 127 which are "responsive to" a FOIA request for
"agency records"' 128 served upon the Board. 129 The Fox court reasoned
that "the [Reserve Banks] lend money pursuant to their own mandate,"
so "records of their lending are not [Board] records."'130
The Bloomberg court took a different approach. It found that the
Board's FOIA regulations mean if "a record is kept in the Board's
official files at a [Reserve Bank], the Secretary of the Board is its
official custodian, regardless of its subject matter, and thus it qualifies as
a Board 'agency record." ' 31 Because the Board did not search any New
York Fed records, the Bloomberg court concluded that "the Board
improperly withheld agency records in response to a FOIA request by
conducting an inadequate search."' 3 2 It ordered the Board to search the
New York Fed for records "that constitute 'Records of the Board' under
the "plain language meaning" of the Board's FOIA regulations.133 In the
Bloomberg court's view, Board records are the Board's central
123. Id. § 261.2.
124. 12 C.F.R. § 261 (2009).
125. Fox News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 639 F.
Supp. 2d 384, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
126. "Thus, not all records kept by the FRBs are records of the Board; only those
reflecting delegated functions .... Id. at 395.
127. Id. at 394.
128. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (2006 & 2009 Supp.) (defining the term "search" under
the FOIA). "In responding ... to a [FOIA] request for records, an agency shall make
reasonable efforts to search for the records .... Id. § 552(a)(3)(L).
129. See Fox News Network, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 396.
130. Id. at 394.
131. Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 08 Civ.
9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, at *9, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942, at *26 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 24, 2009) (citing 12 C.F.R. § 261.3(a) (2009)).
132. Id. at *27.
133. Id. at **26-27 (ordering search under 12 C.F.R. § 261.2(i)(1) (2009)).
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records 13 4 maintained in the performance of functions for or on behalf of
the Board.' A Board attorney who told Judge Preska, after her
decision in Bloomberg, the Fed 36 was determining the issue of "what
record9 would fall under a 'delegated function"' was interrupted and told
by the Judge, ". . . that's not the standard."1
37
2. Should a Deferential Standard of Review Be Applied?
Essential to the Fox Court's holding was the Board's interpretation
of its own regulations. 38  Relying on Bruh v. Bessemer Venture
Partners Ill L.P. ("Bruh"), 139 the Fox court deferred to the
"longstanding practice"'140 of the Board interpreting its own regulations
and assumed such an interpretation "becomes of controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."'
141
a. The Rationale for Deference
The basis for according deference to an agency's interpretation of
an administrative regulation is the Supreme Court's landmark decision
in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. ("Seminole Rock"). 142 The
"essential element" of the Court's holding, upholding the agency's
position, 43 was the Court's independent application of the regulatory
language to the facts at issue. 144 The Court also noted the agency's
134. Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 261.2(a) (2009)).
135. Id.
136. Searching under the standard Preska rejected was "a task assigned to the New
York Fed." See Mark Pittman, Federal Reserve Says Disclosing Loans Will Hurt Banks,
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 27, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aOiqF4X4hNCg.
137. Id.
138. Fox News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 639 F.
Supp. 2d 384, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
139. 464 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2006).
140. Fox News Network, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 394 (internal citations omitted).
141. Id. (quoting Bruh v. Bessemer Venture Partners III, 464 F.3d 202, 207 (2006)
(quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945))).
142. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
143. The rule "clearly applies to the facts of this case" as the agency contended. Id.
at 415.
144. See id. at 414-17.
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interpretation was clearly explained in a bulletin widely distributed to af-
fected parties,145 and the agency "uniformly" took the position. 146 Under
these circumstances, the Court explained, "[a]ny doubts concerning" the
Court's and the agency's interpretation of the regulation were "removed
by reference to the administrative construction."'
' 47
Since Seminole Rock, in Chevron v. NRDC ("Chevron"),148 the
Supreme Court has adopted a deferential test to an agency's statutory
construction.149 Courts must defer to a reasonable statutory construction
by the agency charged with its implementation, even when the agency's
reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory
interpretation. 150
Both Chevron and Seminole Rock stand for the proposition that
deference to an agency interpretation must be grounded in agency
policymaking prerogative and expertise. As the Court. explained in
Chevron:
[I]t is entirely appropriate for executive branch agencies within this
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices
resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by
145. This bulletin, "entitled 'What Every Retailer Should Know About the General
Maximum Price Regulation,' was made available to manufacturers as well as to
wholesalers and retailers." Id. at 417.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
149. Id. at 842-43. The Supreme Court characterized the Chevron test as
"deferential" in Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass 'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 979 (2005). Commentators interpret Chevron as "a vehicle to determine whether
Congress has left a gap in a statutory scheme for an agency to fill with regulations, and
whether the agency's subsequent regulations comport with congressional intent." See
Shay Ellen Zeemer, FMLA Notice Requirements and the Chevron Test: Maintaining a
Hard-Fought Balance, 55 VAND. L. REv. 261, 263 (2002) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842-43).
150. In Nat 7 Cable, the Court held Chevron "requires a federal court to accept the
agency's construction of the statute, even if the agency's reading differs from what the
court believes is the best statutory interpretation." Nat'l Cable, 545 U.S. at 980 (citing
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44); see Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26, 29 (2003)
(upholding a Social Security Administration procedure based upon its regulatory
construction of a statute despite "undesirable results").
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the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of
everyday realities. 151
After Chevron, the Court "has supported Seminole Rock deference
by a similar presumption: 'Because applying an agency's regulation to
complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency's unique
expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power
authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the
agency's delegated lawmaking powers.' ' 52 So, deference to an agency's
interpretation of the law is only appropriate under circumstances where
the agency has both a policymaking prerogative and expertise. Agencies
are typically found to have a policymaking prerogative, entitling their
statutory interpretations to deference when the enabling statute for the
agency authority explicitly delegates specific rulemaking functions to
the agency. In United States v. Mead Corp.,' 53 the Supreme Court
observed "a congressional delegation warrants Chevron deference [only]
when the delegation 'produces regulations or rulings for which
deference is claimed.' ', 54 For example, in Bruh, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed a statute' 55 which "explicitly delegated" to
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") the "policymaking
authority to exempt certain transactions 'as not comprehended within
[the statute's] purpose"' and " . . . admonish[ed] the courts that the
statute 'shall not be construed' otherwise."' 5 6 There, the court found,
"[C]ongress clearly left open a 'gap' in the statute "for the SEC to fill"
with regulatory language.' 57 The court held the SEC's statutory con-
struction, as applied into the facts in Bruh, was "not plainly erroneous,
151. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
152. Bruh v. Bessemer Venture Partners III, 464 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis
added) (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S.
144, 151 (1991)).
153. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
154. Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 259 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal alterations
and citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 213, 229
(discussing forms of congressional delegation to agencies)).
155. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006). The statute at
issue was intended to prevent "the unfair use of information" by corporate insiders.
Bruh, 464 F.3d at 205.
156. Bruh, 464 F.3d at 208 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006)).
157. Roth v. Perseus, LLC, 522 F.3d 242, 249 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843-44).
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and [was] therefore controlling." 8  Under such circumstances, the
SEC's "views are entitled to 'controlling weight' unless the regulation is
'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."" 5 9 Where a
statute contains no explicit delegation to an agency, a policymaking
prerogative requires-at an absolute minimum-political account-
ability. 160
Indicia of agency expertise include technical complexity of a
federal program and the extent of an agency's discretion under its
enabling statute. 161  In Bruh, the SEC had expertise in regulating
dynamic and fast moving markets where statutory disputes typically
involve complex applications of principles Congress only articulates at a
more elementary level. 1
62
b. Deference to the Board's FOIA Regulations is Inappropriate
The Fox court accorded Seminole Rock deference to the Board's
FOIA regulations.163 Doing so constitutes clear error.
First, these Board regulations should be evaluated based on their
adherence to FOIA, not the FRA. The Board's FOIA regulations
unnecessarily conflate FOIA and the FRA.164 The Board's FOIA
regulations define the term "agency records," a term of art under FOIA
litigation. 165 Only in extremely limited circumstances, such as litigation
158. Bruh v. Bessemer Venture Partners III, 464 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 2006).
159. Roth, 522 F.3d at 249 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
160. C.f Bruh, 464 F.3d at 208 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66).
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it
is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did
not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
Id. (emphasis added).
161. C.f Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 259 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Dickson
v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 590 (5th Cir. 2004)).
162. See supra notes 152 & 159 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 125 & 142 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text for a comprehensive discussion
of the regulations and the FRB's attempt to link them with the FRA.
165. C.f DOJ v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989) (Supreme Court rulings
explaining "agency records" under the FOIA); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980). Where a statute includes "a term of art at
common law and we must presume that the Congress used it as such, mutatis mutandis,
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between the Board and an individual Reserve Bank over the custody or
use of records, is it conceivable the FRA would inform the distinction
between Board 'agency records' and Reserve Bank records. The
Board's concerns about the 'systemic risk' presented by banks
'stigmatized' by disclosure of their SCLF borrowings and its impact on
the effectiveness of Fed operations are best characterized as a: 1) a
factual dispute over the extent to which the Board's FOIA compliance
interferes with the Board's ability to fulfill its FRA mandate; 2) a legal
dispute over whether interference with this FRA mandate is a cognizable
interest under the FOIA. 166 The question, then, is whether the FRB's
'agency records' regulations are a permissible construction of the FOIA.
Second, no deference to the Board's 'agency records' regulations is
appropriate under FOIA. Unlike the circumstances at issue in Bruh,
where the SEC had an exclusive and genuine claim to expertise in the
field to which the regulation was applicable, the FOIA is a generic
statute administered by nearly all federal government agencies.
1 61
Generally, "[w]hen a statute is administered by more than one agency, a
particular agency's interpretation is not entitled to Chevron [or Seminole
Rock] deference."'' 68 This is because, "[w]here a statute is generic, two
bases for the Chevron [or Seminole Rock] presumption of implied
delegation are lacking: specialized agency expertise and the greater
likelihood of achieving a unified view through the agency than through
review in multiple courts."' 169 Naturally, agency interpretations of the
FOIA are not entitled to deference. As the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals explained in Collins v. National Transportation Safety
Board, 7 0 "FOIA['s] ... broadly sprawling applicability undermines any
basis for deference, and courts must therefore review interpretative
when it imported the term into the field of bank regulation." Rapaport v. Dep't of
Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision, 59 F.3d 212, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
166. The Board raises, and Fox News Network addresses, these concerns under the
purported "program effectiveness" prong of Exemption Four.
167. See Collins v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
168. Proffitt v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 855, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Bowen v. Am.
Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 643 n.30 (1986)). "[B]ecause multiple agencies promul-
gated rules under statute, 'there is thus not the same basis for deference predicated on
expertise as we found' in Chevron." Id. (paraphrasing and quoting Bowen).
169. Collins, 351 F.3d at 1252-53.
170. Id.
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questions de novo."17 '
The Board is no more expert in the classification, retention and
review of financial records of financial institutions than the many other
federal agencies with similar duties and responsibilities. Agencies such
as the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") and the Office of Thrift Supervision in
the Treasury Department ("OTS") are also responsible for administering
FOIA in this context. A substantial and well-reasoned line of cases in
both the D.C. and Second circuits establish that the interpretation of any
one of these agencies on matters involving the administration of a
banking statute is not entitled to deference. 172 Nor is the Board alone in
administering FOIA in the context of a complex organizational structure
with unique traits and exemptions. 173
Federal courts, not administrative agencies, are ultimately
responsible for construing FOIA. 174  If agencies, as opposed to the
courts or Congress,175 had the luxury of defining the meaning of key
terms under FOIA, the result would be "an intolerable situation in which
different agencies could adopt inconsistent interpretations of the FOIA
and substantially complicate the administration of the Act."' 176 In Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA ("Public Citizen")177 the D.C.
171. Id. at 1253.
172. This has occurred in the context of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989),
and the associated Federal Deposit Insurance Act ("FDIA"), 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006).
See Thornton v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 514 F.3d 1328, 1331 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (affording de novo review of the OCC's interpretation of FIRREA provisions
"because multiple agencies besides the [OCC] administer the act, including the [FRB],
the (FDIC], and the [OTS]"); Proffitt, 200 F.3d at 863 n.7; Cousin v. U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision, 73 F.3d 1242, 1249 (2d Cir. 1996); Rapaport v.
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision, 59 F.3d 212, 215-17 (D.C. Cir.
1995); Wachtel v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d
581, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
173. See, e.g., Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 445 U.S. 136
(1980) (Oval Office); U.S. Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective
Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001) (Bureau of Indian Affairs); Ryan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 617
F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Congress).
174. See Kissinger, 489 U.S. at 755; Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA,
704 F.2d 1280, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)).
175. See infra text accompanying notes 181-85.
176. Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1287.
177. Id. at 1280.
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Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 78 a Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") FOIA regulation 179 defining the term 'trade secret' under
exemption 4180 in a manner so narrow it "would classify virtually all
undisclosed health and safety testing data as trade secrets."' 18' There,
neither the FOIA nor other statutes 182 defined the term and the
legislative history of the FOIA was "similarly unhelpful."'' 83 The court
encountered "substantial problems" because the term was "defined both
broadly and narrowly at common law."' 184  The court concluded that
Congress intended for the language to be construed narrowly. The court
noted the absence of evidence in the legislative history suggesting
Congress intended to define 'trade secrets' broadly'"s and the addition of
another 'prong' for 'commercial or financial information' 186 in the same
statute.187  Most importantly, the agency's broad interpretation of the
FOIA exemption's scope was "ill-suited for the public law context in
which FOIA determinations must be made."1
88
Where, as here, the requisite agency expertise and policymaking
prerogative is lacking in a court's evaluation of an agency policy issued
by the agency to fill a statutory gap left by Congress, 8 9 an agency's
178. Id. at 1287 (stating "we are not bound by the agency's interpretive regulation").
179. 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(a) (2009) (defining an exemption 4 "trade secret" as "any
formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is used in one's business
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it").
180. The exemption applies to "trade secrets and commercial or financial
information .... 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006 & 2009 Supp.) (emphasis added).
181. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1286 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
182. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(a) (2009).
183. Public Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1286.
184. Id. Under the circumstances, the court concluded its choice of definitions was
"relatively unconstrained by prior administrative or judicial actions." Id. at 1287.
185. Id. at 1289.
186. Id.
187. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1289 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
188. Id.
189. It should be noted that Doar, which serves as the basis of this Note's
contemporary interpretation of Skidmore, infra note 190, involved an informal agency
policy. At issue in Doar was a challenge to State Medicaid Manual Section 3259.7, an
informal rule issued by the Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services. Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir.
2009). Keep in mind, however, the informal nature of the pamphlet (in conjunction with
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interpretations of an act it administers are evaluated under a Skidmore v.
Swift & Co. ("Skidmore") 90 standard producing "'a spectrum of judicial
responses, from great respect at one end to near indifference at the
other' .. ,191 In Skidmore, the Supreme Court held "an agency's
'rulings, interpretations and opinions' of an act administered by the
agency, 'while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' 1 92 Like
the FOIA denial, an agency action reviewed de novo under the FOIA, 93
the Fox court should have scrutinized the Board's FOIA regulations.
c. There Is No 'Delegated Authority' Requirement
Even if the Board's FOIA regulations are not accorded deference,
they are still of concern to the courts. Here, the Board relies exclusively
on the first definition of 'agency records' and "interprets the words 'for
or on behalf of the Board' to mean 'under delegated authority from the
Board.""' 194  "[T]he Board interprets the statutory definition of its
records," the Fox court noted, "[p]remised on" the FRA's division of
functions between the Board and the Reserve Banks.' 95 "The history
and structure of the Fed, the Board, and the Reserve Banks, bolster the
Board's statutory interpretation." 1
96
The Board's convoluted argument brings to mind Justice Robert H.
Jackson's famous line: "I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain
a regulation) the Supreme Court found so important in Seminole Rock. See supra notes
142-47 and accompanying text.
190. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
191. Doar, 571 F.3d at 260 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228
(citations omitted)).
192. Id. at 250 (quoting and paraphrasing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944)).
193. See DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989)
(explaining, "[u]nlike the review of other agency action ... the FOIA expressly places
the burden 'on the agency to sustain its action' and directs the district courts to
'determine the matter de novo'" (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B))).
194. Fox News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 639 F.
Supp. 2d 384, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal citations omitted); see Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, supra note 22, at 50.
195. Id. at 395. "In the FRA, Congress divided the powers of the Fed between the
[Board], which is a federal agency, and the [Reserve Banks], which were established as
regional banks." Id.
196. Id.
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meant when he said, 'The more you explain it the more I don't
understand it.' '1" 97'198  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals applied
Jackson's language in Wachtel v. Office of Thrift Supervision 99 to the
OTS argument a statute's definition of "affirmative action" was not
"limited at all by what might be thought to be a definition of affirmative
action" in the statute, but was instead "instead, as more free-floating, not
necessarily bound to Congress' elaboration of the phrase in" the
statute.200 Here, as in Wachtel, the Board's definition relies on its own
construction of a term-'agency records'-in a statute (FOIA)
interpreted and administered by many agencies. In Wachtel, at least the
OTS made its argument in an enforcement order and relied on an agency
interpretation of a statute germane to the issue at hand. Here, however,
the Board makes its argument in a FOIA suit by reference to its
interpretation of a regulation-which is not entitled to deference-based
on a statute, the FRA, attenuated from the FOIA litigation at hand.
Courts should and can be much more skeptical of the Board's
convoluted constructions of its regulations and FOIA.
The Board's attempt to construct its statutory function in a manner
where it can act with no oversight should be vanquished with the same
forceful dismissal a U.S. District Court judge served the Office of the
Vice President under similar circumstances:
[I]t 'borders on the absurd' to believe that Congress statutorily
defined Vice-Presidential records and required the Vice President to
implement steps to preserve them, but denied any judicial review to
prevent the Vice President from using a different definition for Vice-
Presidential records.201
The Board, like the Vice President, "has discretion concerning the
decision to create or dispose of" records, but absent from this discretion
is the "ability to change the definition" agency records or activities
provided by Congress when carrying out the FOIA.20 2
197. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
198. Id. at 214.
199. 982 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
200. Id. at 585.
201. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Cheney, 593 F. Supp. 2d
194, 216 (D.D.C. 2009) (expanding on similar language in Am. Historical Ass'n v.
Peterson, 876 F. Supp. 1300, 1315 (D.D.C. 1995)).
202. "It is clear . . . the Vice President has discretion concerning the decision to
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3. The Board's 'Agency Records' Argument Under Common Law
After courts properly evaluate, without deference, the Board's
FOIA regulations and strip the Board of the 'delegated authority' layer
of obfuscation, the courts take up the issue at common law. Recall the
two Tax Analysts requirements for 'agency records' at common law are
agency creation or procurement and control.
Both the Fox203 and Bloomberg204 courts rejected the common law
'constructive obtainment' 20 5 theory under which the extensive super-
vision of private parties "indicates that these private firms acted on
behalf of' the agency in creating the material and the degree of such
supervision is the basis for the control inquiry.20 6 Because the FOIA
"deals with 'agency records,' not information in the abstract," 20 7 'agency
records' must fall under the agency's actual, rather than theoretical,
control. Thus, the "FOIA applies to records which have been in fact ob-
tained, and not to records which merely could have been obtained.,
20 8
This rationale led the Supreme Court to hold, in Forsham v. Harris,°9
privately generated materials maintained by an institution receiving
federal funds are not subject to the FOIA. After all, a funding agency is
under no obligation to demand data from private parties it contracts
with.210 "[W]ithout first establishing that the agency has created or ob-
create or dispose of Vice-Presidential records, and even how he chooses to preserve
them," the Court noted in Cheney. Id. at 220. "But absent from the Vice President's
discretion is his ability to change the definition of Vice-Presidential records provided by
Congress when exercising his" PRA obligations. Id.
203. Fox News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 639 F.
Supp. 2d 384, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding "what an agency has an ability to obtain,
but has not obtained, is irrelevant" (citing Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 182
(1980))).
204. Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 08 Civ.
9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, at *10, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942, at *21
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009) (quoting Forsham, 445 U.S. at 186).
205. Id.
206. Burka v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 87 F.3d 508, 515 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (rejecting Health & Human Services' Exemption 5 argument and remanding).
207. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 185.
208. Id. at 186.
209. 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
210. Id. at 177 (holding privately generated materials maintained by an institution
receiving grant funds are not subject to FOIA and concluding a grantor agency is not
obligated to demand such data). The Court rejected claims study related materials
produced by a private institution were within the scope of FOIA because: the institution
"received its funds from a federal agency and was subject to some supervision by the
2009
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tained the document, reliance or use is similarly irrelevant", the
Forsham court noted.1
The viability of the Board's 'agency records' argument comes
down to more than just the mechanics of the Fed. The Fox court found
that "[t]he [Fed] is structured to empower local institutions to lend,
while permitting federal oversight. The Board has the authority to
promulgate the rules and regulations to which the Reserve Banks must
adhere." 212 The Fed "is constituted to reflect both public and private
interests. ' 213  The Fed's founders sought to insulate the Board, a
government agency, 14 by incorporating the privately owned Reserve
Banks "as a buffer against an absorption of [central] banking by the
government." 215 The Board is "endowed by legislative mandate with a
substantial degree of independence within government. '' 216 The Board's
agency in its use of those funds;" the agency supervising the grant "had sufficient
authority under its grant agreement to have obtained the data had it chosen to do so;" or
because the data "formed the basis for" the published report of the study which was
relied on by a regulatory agency. Id. at 177.
211. Id. at 186.
212. Fox News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 639 F.
Supp. 2d 384, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
213. Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm'n, 656 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
214. Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 22, at 34; Albrecht v.
Comm. on Employee Benefits of the Fed. Reserve Employee Benefits Sys., 357 F.3d
62, 65-66 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (characterizing the Board as a "governmental entity"). See
44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2006 & 2008 Supp.) (defining the term "independent regulatory
agency" to include the Board for purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-13 § 2, 109 Stat. 164 (1995)); Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 686 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (including "Federal
Reserve" within its listing of independent regulatory agencies) (citing 44 U.S.C. §
3502(5) (2008 Supp.)); Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1982).
See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 241 et seq. (2006); but c.f Research Triangle Inst. v. Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve, 132 F.3d 985, 989 (4th Cir. 1997) (concluding "money
used to fund the [FRB] . . . 'shall not be construed to be Government funds or
appropriated moneys"' (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 244 (2006))).
215. ALFRED JEROME CLIFFORD, THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM 26 (1965).
216. WYATr C. WELLS, ECONOMIST IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: ARTHUR F. BURNS
AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 1970-78 128 (1994) (citing ARTHUR BURNS, REFLECTIONS
OF AN ECONOMIC POLICYMAKER: SPEECHES AND CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENTS, 1969-
1978 346 (1978)). Former FRB Chairman Arthur Bums gloated, "[f]reedom from the
daily pressures of the political process has given the Federal Reserve the opportunity to
make the hard choices that continually confront those who are responsible for economic
and financial policies." Id.
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role in Reserve Bank lending, however, goes beyond mere 'oversight.'
In fact, beginning with the Banking Act of 1933,217 after which Reserve
Banks were, for the first time, prohibited from transacting in the open
market except in accordance with Board regulations, the trend has been
towards greater Board control over Reserve Bank-executed Fed
operations as opposed to less. 1 8
This trend towards Board control is demonstrated by the fact 90%
of known SCLF lending requires Board approval under § 13(3). This
says all the court needs to know about the extent to which the SCLF are
really carried out at the behest of the Board incident to a government
operation." 9 Moreover, the SCLF lending at issue took place during a
period where high-level Board executives were so intimately involved in
the mechanics of the banking system, any distinction between the Board
and much of the SCLF lending out of the Reserve Banks is cosmetic.
As in the latter half of the Great Depression,2 the line between
Treasury and the Board has blurred. Indeed, the Fed and the Treasury
issued a joint press release reiterating the difference between fiscal and
monetary policy. 22' The press release acknowledged the extent to which
the Board was "working closely and cooperatively with the Treasury and
other agencies" in intervening to "prevent the failure of [specific]
institutions that could cause systemic damage, and to foster the
stabilization and repair of the financial system. 22  All forms of wealth
are affected to some degree by Fed monetary policy.2 23 To the extent
217. 12 U.S.C § 227 (2006).
218. Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Leaving each Reserve
Board "free ... to decline to participate in [open market] operations approved by the
[FOMC]" proved too "permissive." Id. at 463-64.
219. June 10 Report, supra note 40, at 1 tbl. 1.
220. JAMEs GRANT, MONEY OF THE MIND: BORROWING & LENDING IN AMERICA
FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO MICHAEL MILKEN 216 (Farrar Strauss Giroux 1992). The Fed
sought to erode the "forms and conventions" of the gold standard, smooth out the
business cycle and serve as the lender of last resort. The government already controlled
the Fed and its reserve banks "in fact" at this point. Id.
221. Joint Statement, supra note 18.
222. Id. at para. 1.
223. See Reuss, 584 F.2d at 469-70. Reuss addressed, among other claims, the
possibility the FOMC's "pervasive regulatory authority" might deprive "a holder of
certain marketable bonds" of property "without due process of the law." Id. at 468.
The claimant, a United States Congressman, argued the FOMC's effect on interest rates
and the rate of inflation could reduce the value of his bonds in several ways. Id. at 462,
468-69 & n.23. The Reuss Court held the claimant lacked standing to sue as a
bondholder. Id. at 470.
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SCLF lending means Fed policy is enriching some more than others,
akin to fiscal policy normally administered by politically accountable
government officials, 224 it should be subject to the 'sunshine' under the
FOIA.
This perception, that the Board's SCLF lending is carried out by the
government, is reinforced by shocking revelations that the Treasury
Secretary, ostensibly at the direction of Board Chairman Ben Bernanke,
ordered a bank merger by invoking Board regulatory authority. Former
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said in his "strong message", "that it
would be unthinkable for" for Bank of America ("BOA") to invoke its
right to call off the pending merger with Merrill-Lynch ("ML") in the
event of a 'material adverse change,' included reference to the Fed's
power to oust BOA management.225 Paulson said his statement
"reinforc[ed] the view. . . expressed by the [Board], as Bank of
America's regulator., 226 This episode, if indicative of typical Board
interaction with SCLF borrowers, is sufficient to create a strong
presumption that every interaction between financial institutions and the
Fed is in furtherance of some Board-and consequently government-
objective.
The ML-BOA episode also reveals the extent to which the Board
exerts actual control over the timing and extent of SCLF borrowers'
disclosure. Details about the "accelerating fourth quarter loss" at ML
and BOA's "concerns" about consummating the transaction 227 did not
begin trickling out until a month after BOA's chief Ken Lewis raised the
issues in a heated dialogue with Fed officials and the Treasury
228Secretary. The merger was announced in September, approved by
shareholders in December, and consummated with $20 billion in
224. See, e.g., Joint Statement, supra note 18.
225. The order of this language is inverted for clarity, but the meaning is the same.
Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: Hearing Before Comm. on H. Oversight and
Government Reform, 111 th Cong. (2009) (statement of Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Former
Secretary U.S. Department of Treasury).
226. This Fed power, in Paulson's view, "could be ... and should be" used against
the "management and board of a regulated entity that triggered ...destabilization
within their own institution..." by undertaking such a "destructive action for which
there was no reasonable legal basis and which would show a lack ofjudgment." Id. at 3-
4.
227. Id.
228. Dan Fitzpatrick et al., In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, WALL ST. J., Feb.
5, 2009, at Al.
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additional aid and $118 billion in protection against losses on troubled
assets in January.229 In this context, Bernanke testified that "disclosure
obligations belong squarely with [BOA], and the [Board] did not
interfere in the company's disclosure decisions. 230  Still, the Fed's
"legitimate interest in knowing when [BOA or Merrill] intended to
disclose the [Merrill] losses" in light of the "potential for a strong,
adverse market reaction" meant "[i]f federal assistance to stabilize
[BOAMerrill] were to be effective, the necessary facilities would have
to be in place as of the disclosure date. 231 If the Board can dictate the
timing of disclosure by a private party, it can certainly control the
disclosures of Reserve Banks it is charged with overseeing.
The circumstances of the SCLF lending and the resulting paper trail
are well within the traditional 'agency records' requirements under the
Forsham and Tax Analysts regime.
III. QUALITATIVE ARGUMENTS FOR NONDISCLOSURE
Once the court determines 'agency records' are at issue, a court's
'qualitative' analysis of the rationale for nondisclosure supersedes the
'structural' issues which primarily guided the court's 'agency records'
determination.232
229. Id.; see also Michael R. Crittenden, Fed Emails Bash BofA Chief in Tussle
Over Merrill Deal, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2009, at Al; Michael R. Crittenden & Dan
Fitzpatrick, Lewis Takes Heat but Defends Merrill Deal: Lawmakers Question BofA 's
CEO on Role of Federal Officials; Paulson, Bernake Next Up?, WALL ST. J., June 12,
2009, at Cl. The government's Securities and Exchange Commission attempted to
bury the ML-BOA nondisclosure episode in a settlement rejected by a U.S. District
Court judge as:
[S]uggest[ing] a rather cynical relationship between the parties: the S.E.C. gets to
claim that it is exposing wrongdoing on the part of the Bank of America in a high-
profile merger; the Bank's management gets to claim that they have been coerced into
an onerous settlement by overzealous regulators. And all this is done at the expense,
not only of the shareholders, but also of the truth.
SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83502, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14,
2009). This settlement would have transferred BOA shareholders' money back to the
government without punishing the actual wrongdoers. A true enforcement action would
have targeted BOA's Lewis for his cowardly conduct and former Treasury Secretary
Paulson for engaging in sovereign securities fraud.
230. Acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America: Hearing Before the Comm.
on H. Oversight and Government Reform, 11 th Cong. (2009) (statement of Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve).
231. Id.
232. Compare the "agency records" requirements in supra text accompanying notes
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The qualitative rationale for nondisclosure, ostensibly, is that "the
Fed is mindful of the stigma that might be associated with being named
by the Fed as a borrower, which could be interpreted as a sign of
weakness., 233  The Board's Director of Monetary Affairs ("MA")2 134
submitted an affidavit in the Bloomberg case supporting the Board's
stigma justification, in which he argued that,
[T]he publication of such information would lead to an increased
reluctance of borrowers to use such facilities. As a result, the ability
of the [Reserve Bank's] lending to serve as a safety valve in
relieving liquidity strains for individual depository institutions and
the banking system, and to complement open market operations...
would be reduced. 235
The government's concern about stigmatizing financial institutions
is not confined to Fed assistance. The motivation for forcing all of the
biggest banks to take $250 billion in Treasury equity stakes in the fall of
2008, under a program dubbed 'TARP,' 23 6 was informed by fears
depositors and creditors would interpret an injection of government
82 (creation or procurement) and 83 (control), with the exemption four confidentiality
requirements in supra text accompanying notes 89 (disclosure would impair the
government's ability to collect information in the future) and 90 (disclosure would
cause substantial competitive harm). The "agency records" analysis is a determination
of "what is where," while the exemption arguments are concerned with "why are the
records where they are," "what might transpire if they are disclosed" and "why." But
see Exemption Four's "obtained from a person" requirement, supra text accompanying
note 86, and Exemption Five's inter- or intra-agency requirements, supra text
accompanying note 94, both of which are more akin to the structural "agency records"
arguments than confidentiality under Exemption Four or deliberative and leading up to
a contract in Exemption Five. Overall, however, the analysis of records under the FOIA
exemptions is more intellectually challenging and qualitative in nature than the "agency
records" issue. But for the inclusion of a delegation requirement in the Board's
regulations, which made "agency records" somewhat interesting here, there would be
little beyond factual declarations about document locations to discuss under a traditional
"agency records" analysis.
233. Brian Blackstone, Fed Makes $2.7 Billion, Offers Details on Loans, WALL ST.
J., June 11, 2009, at A2.
234. Madigan Declaration, supra note 99, at 14 (discussing Section 13(3) lending
and the TAF).
235. Id.
236. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765 (2008).
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capital as a sign of weakness.237 When the TARP plan was announced,
Senator Chuck Schumer said he hoped "[w]idespread bank participation
will reduce the risk that depositors may flee or that other institutions will
refuse to do business with banks that accept or request public capital." '238
Other observers share the government's fear, warning that the situation
could be "very bad" if financial institutions were stigmatized.239
Disclosure proponents, including a former Commodities and
Futures Trading Commission commissioner and chairman who
submitted a brief in the Bloomberg case, 240 argue that there was no
stigma attached to SCLF borrowing during this macroeconomic liquidity
shock. "The illiquidity that has plagued the financial markets . . . is
largely systemic, due in part to uncertainty regarding the values of assets
and liabilities, many of which are held by financial entities across
various sectors and regions ... the signal sent when institutions access
the funds is not idiosyncratic or particular to the financial institution for
whom the information is disclosed.,
241
237. Interestingly, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson "actively opposed the idea of
investing in banks" while Bernanke "was an early advocate." Deborah Solomon et al.,
U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation's Largest Banks; Recipients Include Citi, Bank ofAmerica,
Goldman; Government Pressures All to Accept Money as Part of Broadened Rescue
Effort, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2008, at Al. Paulson feared a program of direct equity
investments in banks would require the government to pick winners and losers, expose
the banks to government meddling and discourage participation "because of the
perceived stigma" associated with such public investments. Id.
238. Charles Schumer, How to Rescue the Banks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2008, at
A21 (arguing "we need to start by persuading a substantial cross section of major banks,
even those in relatively good health, to accept capital"). The participation of healthy
banks was viewed by supporters as "TARP's best feature" while critics lambasted it as a
"silly idea . .. from a Treasury that claims to trust markets and encourage
transparency." Steven Pearlstein, Hank Paulson's $125 Billion Mistake, WASH. POST,
Oct. 31, 2008, at Dl; see also Allan Sloan, An Excess of Bashing, WASH. POST, Mar.
17, 2009, at Dl.
239. Sloan, supra note 238 (urging critics to "act like grown-ups and stop pointing
fingers until the danger passes" and warning the "financial system and economy are on
the edge of the abyss, as they were in September").
240. Declaration of Sharon Brown-Hruska, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 08 Civ. 9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 74942 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009) (filed in support of FRB Summary Judgment
Memo). Brown-HRnska is a research economist and former CFTC commissioner and
chairman. Id. at 3. She notes her "deep appreciation for and understanding of the
charge of federal agencies to promote their efficient function while seeking to maintain
stability and confidence." Id. at 3.
241. Id. at 17.
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If revelations about an institution's SCLF borrowing are a sign of
the borrower's instability, the consequences of disclosure are not the
result of stigma. In fact, an economist who has studied bank panics
during the Great Depression 242 argues disclosure in times of financial
distress can have a positive economic impact by pointing borrowers to
banks with the resources to lend.243 In addition, savvy customers and
investors "are quite capable of sniffing out weak financial institutions
long before managements come clean.",244  If the market's reaction to
greater transparency in FOMC decision-making 245 is any indication,
markets are likely to rely more on actual SCLF data than other sources
of information about the health of banks246 with the possible result of
less conjecture and volatility.2 47 There is a substantial economic case for
disclosure of SCLF lending.
242. Telephone Interview with Joseph R. Mason, Moyse/LBA Chair of Banking,
Ourso School of Business, Louisiana State University (Mar. 4, 2009) (on file with
author).
243. Id.
244. Pearlstein, supra note 238. While Pearlstein was discussing investors, keep in
mind depositors who maintain a balance in excess of the federally insured amount or
invest in bank debt such as certificates of deposit are also "investors."
245. Beginning in May of 1999, the FOMC began releasing "a forward-looking
element, in the form of an outlook for the monetary policy stance initially, and a
balance-of-risks assessment concerning inflationary pressures and economic conditions
in the 'foreseeable future"' immediately after its meetings. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel
Fratzscher, Transparency, Disclosure and the Federal Reserve 5 (Eur. Cent. Bank,
Frankfurt, F.R.G., Working Paper Series, 2005).
246. Cf id. at 27. Before possible greater FOMC "communication ...such as
speeches, interviews and testimonies by FOMC members . . . exerted a significantly
larger impact on financial markets . . . . [and] markets reacted more strongly to releases
of macroeconomic fundamentals .... In this sense, markets may merely have shifted
their attention from other types of information.., to the statements and balance-of-risks
assessments of the FOMC decisions themselves to obtain the relevant information." Id.
(emphasis added).
247. Specifically, Ehrmann and Fratzscher found "volatility induced by FOMC
meetings has been significantly lower since" the adoption of the disclosure measures
discussed. Id. See supra text accompanying note 245. "[M]arkets have anticipated
monetary policy decisions equally well under both regimes, when comparing the
expectations just before each meeting with the actual decisions." Id. at 26. "[M]arkets
anticipate the next monetary policy decision earlier under the new disclosure regime,
such that market interest rates move by a smaller magnitude over the whole inter-
meeting period under the new regime." Id. at 27. Such findings support the arguments
of Pearlstein, supra note 238, and Mason, supra text accompanying note 242.
BACKDOOR BAILOUT DISCLOSURE
Such concerns do not appear to be holding back Board Chairman
Ben Bernanke's Fed. The Fed's § 13(3) lending authority is vague, but
it is now being stretched as never before.248 In a statement, the
importance of which cannot be overstated, Bernanke said the Fed stands
behind every large financial institution with the potential to endanger the
stability of the financial system:
[T]he Federal Reserve ...will take any necessary and appropriate
steps to ensure that our banking institutions have the capital and
liquidity necessary to function well in even a severe economic
downturn. Moreover, we have reiterated the U.S. government's
determination to ensure that systemically important financial
institutions continue to be able to meet their commitments. 249
This rationale for SCLF lending, predicated on 'systemic risk,' 250 is
effectively the policy of the Fed. It is grounded in Bernanke's
observation 25 that the early 1930's banking panic 252 exacerbated the
Great Depression,253 when 9,000 banks failed from 1930-1933.54
248. See, e.g., Justin Lahart, Central Banks Are Creatures of Financial Crises: From
the BOE to the Fed, Institutions That Sprang from Burst Bubbles Adopt New Shapes in
Current Convulsions, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2009, at A12 (noting the Fed "has come to
the rescue so many times that even seasoned central-bank watchers have trouble
keeping track"); see supra text accompanying notes 16-28 (describing extent of Fed
lending) and notes 26-34 (describing specific SCLF programs to carry out this lending).
249. Ben S. Bernake, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Financial Reform to Address
Systemic Risk, Address Before Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 10, 2009)
(transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke
2009031 Oa.htm).
250. Systemic risk is defined as serious insolvency and liquidity problems with the
potential to jeopardize the stability of entire financial system. Jean-Charles Rochet &
Jean Tirole, Controlling Risk in Payment Systems, in WHY ARE THERE SO MANY
BANKING CRISES? 159, 162 (Jean-Charles Rochet ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2008); see
also Mareclo Dabos, Too Big to Fail in the Banking Industry: A Survey, in Too BIG TO
FAIL 141, 143 (Benton E. Gup ed., Greenwood 2004) (highlighting systemic risks as
the: "potential spillover effects leading to widespread depositor runs, impairment of
public confidence in the broader financial system, or serious disruptions in domestic
and international payment and settlement systems").
251. "[P]roblems of the financial system tended to lead output declines ...." Ben S.
Bemanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great
Depression, 73(3) AM. ECON. REv. 257 (1983).
252. See CHARLES P. KiNDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION: 1929-1939 195-
96 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1986) (explaining the highlights of the banking panic).
253. Lending is essential to Bernanke's ability to keep his "public vow" to famed
economist Milton Friedman: "Regarding the Great Depression, you're right, we did it.
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Tragically, the money stock fell over one-third between 1929 and
1933255 and commercial deposits fell 42% or $18 billion.256 These bank
failures made borrowing impossible for most individuals and small
businesses.257 This banking crisis combined with a debt crisis, as
debtors were unable to pay off existing obligations.258 Some Great
Depression scholarship suggests the banking collapse of 1933 was
caused in part by 25 9 congressionally mandated Reconstruction Finance
Corporation260 ("RFC") disclosure requirements.26' In Bernanke's view,
We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again." Wessel, supra note 13.
Bernanke's research built on Friedman's work. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernake, Governor,
Fed. Reserve Sys., Money, Gold, and the Great Depression, Remarks at the H. Parker
Willis Lecture in Economic Policy (Mar. 2, 2004) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200403022/default.htm)
(describing Friedman and Schwartz's arguments as "highly influential" and saying they
"deserve enormous credit for bringing the role of monetary factors to the fore").
254. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1867-1960 351 (Princeton Univ. Press 1971).
255. "[T]he demand for the sum of deposits and currency was reduced by the
diminished attractiveness of deposits [because] of the bank failures." Id. at 353.
256. Id.
257. The "banking crisis" is the inability of bank borrowers to access needed credit.
Bank borrowers are defined as "those whose liabilities are too few to be publicly
traded." Bernanke, supra note 251, at 51.
258. The debt crisis was defined as a "progressive erosion of borrowers' collateral
relative to debt burdens." Id. at 53.
259. See, e.g., KINDLEBERGER, supra note 252, at 194 (arguing Bank Panic had
"complex political roots" in the RFC disclosure). The RFC was largely unsuccessful.
"Beyond doubt, the continuation of suspensions among banks of all types, long after the
[RFC] had ample opportunity to aid, was depressing." J. Franklin Ebersole, One Year of
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 47 Q. J. ECON. 3 464, 478-79 (1933).
"Probably the detailed monthly reports after July, 1932, did direct the public's attention to
some of the weaker spots, but it is rather far fetched to assume that complete deferment of
publicity would have restored insolvent banks to solvency. The banking situation in general
was too desperate to stand or fall upon the mere issue of publicity. There had been too much
concealment too long." Id. at 479.
260. Reconstruction Finance Corporation (Strategic Material Loan) Act, 72 Pub. L.
No. 2 , 47 Stat. 5 (1932) (repealed 1957). The RFC began liquidating in 1953 and
dissolved in 1957. Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act, 83 Pub. L. No.
163, 67 Stat. 230 (1953) (liquidating the RFC created under the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation (Strategic Material Loan) Act by providing for RFC's continuation through
the summer of 1954 and terminating its lending powers in the Fall of 1953);
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1957, 22 Fed. Reg. 4633, 71 Stat. 647 (1957) (abolishing
the RFC and transferring remaining functions to the Housing and Home Finance
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the Great Depression teaches policymakers that a healthy and
operational financial sector, fully capable of providing much needed
'financial intermediation' services, is essential to maintaining stability
and economic growth. 262 Today's SCLF lending, 'systemic risk' policy
and 'stigma' arguments are, in part, 263 a product of these lessons.
Agency, General Services Administration, Small Business Administration and
Commerce Department). The RFC was an executive branch agency created during the
Great Depression by President Herbert Hoover as "bank closings increased in size and
currency hoarding became notorious ...." Ebersole, supra note 259, at 466; Joseph R.
Mason, The Political Economy of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance
During the Great Depression, 40 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 101, 102 (2003).
261. In the summer of 1932, a few months before the banking crisis began in
earnest, a RFC official gave Congress a dire warning: disclosure of the names of
institution's borrowing from the RFC and the amount of their loans would be
"decidedly harmful." 75 CONG. REc. 15,491 (1932) (statement of G.R. Cooksey,
Secretary, Reconstruction Finance Corporation). The RFC argued the "particularly
sensitive character" of the relationship between the public and their financial
institutions meant disclosure "would undo much that has been accomplished by [the
RFC] in preserving the credit structure of the Nation and, in a large measure, restrict its
usefulness in the future." Id. Congress ignored these warnings and RFC disclosure
provisions were "designed merely to criticize" the first RFC Chairman, Charles Dawes,
whose own bank borrowed heavily shortly after his resignation. FRANK FREIDEL,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 180 (Little Brown 1973). Publication of current lists of RFC
borrowers on a monthly basis began in November 1932. Ebersole, supra note 259, at
474. As the banking crisis intensified in January of 1933, for example, supra text
accompanying note 253, the RFC was ordered to disclose the names of all 4,000
financial institutions which had borrowed from the RFC since July of 1932.
262. "[B]ecause markets for financial claims are incomplete, intermediation between
some classes of borrowers and lenders requires nontrivial market-making and
information-gathering services." Bernanke, supra note 25 1, at 42. "The disruptions of
[the] 1930-33 ... [banking panic] reduced the effectiveness of the financial sector as a
whole in performing these [essential intermediation] services. As the real costs of
intermediation increased, some borrowers.., found credit to be expensive and difficult
to obtain." Id. "[G]iven the policy followed by the [Fed], the [bank] failures were the
mechanism through which a drastic decline was produced in the stock of money,"
Milton Friedman concluded. See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 254, at 351.
Friedman argued the Fed failed to take drastic enough action to revive the banking
sector because Board members and other Fed officials regarded the failures as bad
management and an inevitable result of excess. See id. at 358-59. Friedman concluded
these views reflected the following four factors: (1) the FRS had "no feeling of
responsibility" for non FRS member banks; (2) Most influential bankers were big banks
who hated smaller banks; (3) Most failures were non-FRS members; (4) Few large
member banks failed. Id. Unable to access new credit or pay off old debts, consumers
cut back and businesses retrenched. Ogden L. Mills, then-Treasury Undersecretary,
lamented, "deflation has proceeded much too far. Every additional decline in credit and
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A. Evidentiarv Burden
The Board's economic arguments about 'stigma' must withstand
the court's application of the law establishing the government's
evidentiary burden. "The burden is on the agency to demonstrate, not
the requester to disprove, that the materials sought ... have not been
'improperly' 'withheld"' 264 under a FOIA exemption. This requirement
logically places the burden of "justifying the withholding on the only
party able to explain it."' 265  To justify withholding under exemptions
prices and securities brings with it further bank failures, and bank failures in their turn
lead to further contraction in credit and prices." Ebersole, supra note 259, at 468 n.2
(quoting 134 COMMERCIAL & FIN. CHRON. 784-85 (Jan. 30, 1932)). Bernanke
concluded that "the effects of this credit squeeze on aggregate demand helped convert
the severe but not unprecedented downturn of 1929-30 into a protracted depression."
Bemanke, supra note 251, at 42.
263. Another reason for non-disclosure of the SCLF lending, arguably of equal
importance to the Board's "stigma" and "systemic risk" arguments, is political
expediency. "[T]he refusal of [the legislative and executive branch and the FRS] to
deal with each other in a rational, coherent way is itself very destructive ... to be blunt,
I think both sides like it like that, I don't think the President and the Congress want to
consult with the Federal Reserve in any serious way about fiscal policy. I think they
have seen the Fed as this spooky temple that will clean up the mess if they are having
excesses and they don't want to be responsible for that." The Federal Reserve
Accountability Act of 1993: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban
Affairs, 103rd Cong. 41 (1993) (statement of William Greider, Author, Secrets of the
Temple). If the Board and the U.S. Treasury leadership can take unpopular but
needed-in their view-steps to arrest the crisis, Fed secrecy affords economic
policymakers the luxury of acting without provoking a public outcry. "[O]ne mistake
has been the degree to which recession-fighting has gotten mixed up with the system-
bracing that should have been the preoccupation of the technocrats, with the less said to
the broader public the better," opined columnist Holman W. Jenkins in the Wall Street
Journal. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., How Democracy Ruined the Bailout, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 18, 2009, at A15. "Had matters simply been left in the hands of the Federal
Reserve and fellow bank regulators, the 'crisis' might have become fodder for little
more than future late-night reminiscences by retired bureaucrats, pleasuring themselves
with how closely the world came to burning down without the public ever knowing it."
Id. The appealing counterargument to such practical considerations, in a democracy
such as the United States, is "[i]t is very hard for any public official to go home and
explain that $2.2 trillion of your money was lent out and we don't know where it went."
Jon Hilsenrath & Corey Boles, Senate Seeks Names of Finance Firms Receiving Fed
Aid, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123870067196983547
.html#articleTabs%3Darticle (quoting Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders).
264. DOJ v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 n.3 (1989).
265. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 89-813, at 8 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 9
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four and five, the court's method of evaluating the strength of the
Board's economic arguments is particularly important.
"[I]t is the function of the federal courts to distill facts and make
conclusions" the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Grand
Central Partnership, Inc. v. Cuomo ("Grand Central").266 In FOIA
cases, district courts "may grant summary judgment in favor of an
agency 'on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable
specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they
are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by
evidence of agency bad faith."
267
As applied by the Grand Central court, the standard is flexible and
dependent upon an agency's ability to attribute any questionable
justifications for withholding material to an affiant with personal
knowledge. 268  An e-mail exchange 269 between agency employees
discussing the investigation into alleged improprieties by the FOIA
requester 27 was held exempt from disclosure under exemption five 27 1 on
the basis of an affidavit submitted by an agency employee and the
court's in camera review 272 of the document. 273 The affiant claimed he
personally "relied upon the advice and opinions expressed in these
discussions in deciding to impose" sanctions on the FOIA requester and
"in formulating my recommendation" on the issue to the agency
(1966)).
266. 166 F.3d 473, 480 (2d Cir. 1999).
267. Id. at 478 (quoting Gallant v. NLRB, 26 F.3d 168, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
268. C.f id. at 480-83. In making an "agency records" factual determination, the
court rejected the conclusions of an agency affiant without personal knowledge of the
records at issue even though the affidavit stated the withheld material was "integral" to
the agency's ongoing investigation of the FOIA requester, was used by agency staff "in
the ongoing decision making process with respect to this investigation," and "reflect[ed]
internal discussions among [agency] officials preceding" the decisions. Id. The court
held such an affidavit provided an insufficient factual basis to determine whether
contested items were "agency records" or personal materials. Id.
269. The case refers to "an e-mail" but everything else in this discussion, which is
limited to "document 4" appears to encompass multiple documents. It seems logical to
assume this was an e-mail exchange.
270. Grand Cent. P'ship v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 482 (2d Cir. 1999).
271. Id. at 483 (holding material is pre-decisional and deliberative as required for
nondisclosure under exemption five); see supra text accompanying note 70 for a
description of exemption five and the applicable standard.
272. Grand Cent. P'ship, 166 F.3d at 482.
273. Id. at 483 & n.3.
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headquarters.7 4 The court had reason to believe the affiant sought to
withhold the material because it would reveal political machinations
which would embarrass the agency. 275 Despite such 'red flags,' the
Grand Central court determined additional witnesses were
unnecessary2 76 and concluded the material "directly related to the three
agency decisions" detailed in the agency affiant's affidavit and "had a
direct bearing on the actual exercise of a policy judgment. 277
The Board relies on Comstock International (U.S.A.), Inc. v.
Export-Import Bank278 because it apparently puts such a low evidentiary
burden on an exemption four request. Board affidavits about the
economic impact of disclosure are sufficient in light of the Comstock
court's conclusion "that [Export-Import Bank ("EIB")] 27 9 affidavits
offer[ed] specific factual or evidentiary material to satisfy [the
independent federal agency's] burden under exemption [four]. 280
274. Id. at 483.
275. Nearly a year after "several newspapers published reports" the FOIA requesting
organization "used abusive and sometimes violent tactics to remove homeless persons
from public spaces," id. at 477, the agency terminated a grant, required the return of
grant funds and imposed a limited sanction. Id. at 483 n.3. Six months later,
approximately eighteen months after the negative press coverage, the organization
voided the sanction. Id. Where, as in Grand Central, the organization which was the
object of these supposedly confidential investigative reports sought the material's
disclosure, something is amiss. In all likelihood, the material would have revealed the
agency's motivations for imposing the sanctions was the agency's perceived need to
take ceremonial action to appease a constituency out for vengeance long enough for the
issue to die before rolling the decision back when the heat was off. Unfortunately, the
likelihood the agency affiant was motivated by such nefarious considerations is an
inappropriate basis for weighing the merits of the claimed FOIA exemption. See Loving
v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 550 F.3d 32, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted)
(explaining "the requester's identity matters only where ... the objection to disclosure
is based on a claim of privilege and the person requesting disclosure is the party
protected by the privilege" (citing DOJ v. Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771, (1989); United Techs. Corp. v. FAA, 102 F.3d 688, 692 (2d
Cir. 1996))); but see infra text accompanying note 418 (stating nondisclosure often
accompanies agency impropriety).
276. Grand Cent. P'ship v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 483 n.4 (2d Cir. 1999).
277. Id. at 483.
278. 464 F. Supp. 804 (D.D.C. 1979).
279. Id. at 808.
280. Federal Reserve Bank's Reply and Opposition to Plaintiffs Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment at 12 n.7, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., No. 08 Civ. 9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942
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Comstock involved a FOIA request for disclosure of a loan agreement,
detailing the terms and conditions under which EIB extended credit and
loan guarantees for 21' an oil and gas development company wholly
owned by a foreign government 28 2 for the purchase of goods and
services for a project 283 to expand an oil pipeline in the foreign
country.28 4 The EIB, an independent federal agency, seeks to facilitate
and finance exports and imports between the United States and other
countries through the provision of loans, guarantees, and other forms of
financial assistance. 28 5 EIB argued disclosure of the loan agreement
"would significantly impair its ability to promote United States exports."
Specifically, according to the EIB: "[P]otential loan applicants might
seek financing outside the United States because of their unwillingness
to subject themselves to the possible risk of disclosure" and impair
EIB's ability to compete with other government-supported export credit
unions; "[B]orrowers would be less inclined to make concessions that
could be disclosed to a future lender" and impair EIB's ability to
negotiate loan agreements; and commercial banks would be hesitant to
participate on joint loan agreements with EIB "impairing [EIB's] ability
to control overall financing of transactions." The district court held
"circumstances justify nondisclosure of the loan agreement.' 286
In the same vein, the Board says it "met its burden of demonstrating
that the documents are exempt under the [purported program
effectiveness287] prong" of exemption four. 28 8 The Board offers an affi-
davit from the Board's Director of Monetary Affairs 28 9 predicting an
increased reluctance by borrowers to use the Board's emergency
facilities would impair the "safety valve role" of the discount window
290
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009) (internal citations omitted (citing Comstock, 464 F. Supp. at
808)) [hereinafter Fed Reply and Opposition].
281. Comstock, 464 F. Supp. at 805-6.
282. Id. at 805.
283. Comstock Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Export-Import Bank, 464 F. Supp. 804, 806
(D.D.C. 1979).
284. Id. at 805.
285. Id. See also infra text accompanying note 304.
286. Comstock, 464 F. Supp. at 808.
287. See infra text accompanying notes 328-71.
288. Fed Reply and Opposition, supra note 280, at 12.
289. Madigan Declaration, supra note 99.
290. Interestingly, the Board's memo only relies on the Declaration of FRB
employee Brian F. Madigan for a discussion of the DW, id., but relies on the
Declaration of FRBNY employee Susan E. McLaughlin for the DW and PDCF. See
McLaughlin Declaration, supra note 32. Fed Reply and Opposition, supra note 280, at
2009
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and "greatly complicate[]" the Board's ability to manipulate short-term
interest rates or and otherwise make it "more difficult" for the Fed to
achieve its statutory objectives.2 9' The Board also offers an affidavit
from a senior vice president in the New York Fed's Markets group
292
charged with overseeing the discount window and PDCF arguing
"disclosure of details regarding which institutions are availing
themselves of the discount window and the PDCF . . . would cause
financial institutions to avoid using these liquidity tools - even when
needed - to alleviate market pressures." 293
A court's view of the legal sufficiency of such Board statements, in
light of Grand Central and Comstock, forms the heart of the exemption
four and five analyses which follow.
B. Exemption Four
If the court gets to exemption four, it will have determined the
records at issue are 'agency records.' 294 Once the court establishes the
SCLF records are 'agency records,' the court will turn to the first
element necessary to qualify for nondisclosure under exemption four:
the withheld material must be 'obtained from a person.' 295 If the court
concludes the Board SCLF records at issue are 'obtained from a person,'
then the court must determine if disclosure of the records would
implicate exemption four's confidentiality requirement.2 96 These issues
are discussed in turn.
1. Obtained From a Person Under Exemption Four
The Board argues Board staff obtained the information used to
prepare the records at issue from the Reserve Banks, which in turn
12.
291. Fed Reply and Opposition, supra note 280, at 12 (citing Madigan Declaration,
supra note 99 (internal quotations omitted)).
292. McLaughlin Declaration, supra note 32.
293. Fed Reply and Opposition, supra note 280 (citing McLaughlin Declaration,
supra note 32 (internal quotations omitted)).
294. Recall, only "agency records" are subject to the FOIA. See Kissinger v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
295. See supra text accompanying note 86.
296. See id. Confidentiality is a better fit under these circumstances than trade
secrets.
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obtained and derived that information from records of transactions with
SCLF borrowers. The Board's 'obtained from a person' argument
makes three presumptions: the SCLF borrowers at issue are the source
of the information contained within the SCLF records at issue; the
records are submitted by the SCLF borrowers to the Reserve Banks; and
the Reserve Banks provide the information to the Board.297
The process by which the SCLF records at issue are generated
2 98
led the Fox and Bloomberg courts to different conclusions. 299 The only
overlap between the information SCLF borrowers supplied upon
application to the Reserve Banks for SCLF loans and the records at issue
is the identity of the SCLF borrower, Judge Preska reasoned in
Bloomberg. Everything else was "generated ... from statistics [the
Reserve Banks] kept concerning the [SCLF] lending programs."300
Therefore, according to the Bloomberg court, the SCLF records are not
'obtained from a person' 3°' under the "plain language meaning of
obtain. 30 2 These same facts led the Fox court to conclude the SCLF
borrowers provide their identity, the amount they wish to borrow and the
collateral they wish to pledge and found such "information .
originated with the borrower and is reflected in the [requested] data...
" Accordingly, Judge Hellerstein held the information "was 'obtained
297. Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 22, at 16; Fed Reply and
Opposition, supra note 280, at 12.
298. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
299. Compare Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 08
Civ. 9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, at *13, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942, at *40
(holding "[t]he Board has not met its burden of showing that the information ... was
obtained from a person and, indeed, has raised no material issue of fact"), with Fox
News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 639 F. Supp. 2d
384, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding the Board's SCLF information "was 'obtained from'
the [SCLF] borrower").
300. Bloomberg, 2009 WL 2599336, at * 12, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942, at *38.
301. "The fact that the [Reserve Banks] themselves generated the information
contained in the Remaining Term Reports is sufficient to vitiate the applicability of
Exemption 4 with respect to that information." Id. at *13, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
74942, at *39. "It is evident from the Board's own testimony that the bulk of the
information contained in the Remaining Term Reports was generated by the [New York
Fed] and other [Reserve Banks] operating [discount window] programs." Id. at *12,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942, at *38.
302. Id. at *12, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942, at *36 (defining "obtained" as "[t]o
come into the possession of; to procure; to get, acquire, or secure," id. at n. 13 (quoting
OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2009)), and "to gain or attain possession or disposal of
usually by some planned action or method," id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED (2009)).
2009
306 FORDHAMJOURNAL Vol. XV
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
from' the SCLF borrower.30 3
Essentially, the Fox and Bloomberg courts disagree about the
significance of what happens in between a SCLF loan origination and
the production of the records at issue by Board staff. The following two
examples shed light on this process.
The Export-Import Bank ("EIB")-which provides guarantees,
insurance, and extensions of credit on competitive terms to American
exporters 304-- obtained exporters'3 °5 "financial status and/or export
plans"306 from a person 3 07 the District Court for the District of Columbia
held in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank.3 °8 At issue was a
FOIA request directed towards the EIB.3 °9 The court concluded the EIB
"obtained the information from the insurance applicants themselves,
commercial lenders for the applicant, or a purchaser of the goods at
issue."'3
10
The Small Business Administration's ("SBA") records of 1,800
individual loan amounts, balances outstanding and payment, collection,
or discharge status3 1' was not provided by the borrowers to the
government,"'31 2 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New
York held in Buffalo Evening News, Inc. v. Small Business
Administration ("Buffalo").313 The SBA generated this information "in
the course of its involvement with its borrowers."31 4 The routine records
kept by the SBA in the course of administering the accounts "in no way
implicates any of the financial information [the borrowers] provided...
to the government." '315 "[T]he only connection between" these SBA
303. Fox News Network, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 399.
304. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank, 108 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24 (D.D.C.
2000). The EIB is supposed to play a bigger role where private financing and insurance
is unavailable because of risk factors specific to the importing country. Id.
305. Specifically "insurance applicant's." Id. at 28.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 28.
308. Id.
309. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank, 108 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23-24 (D.D.C.
2000).
310. Id. at 28.
311. See Buffalo Evening News, Inc. v. Small Bus. Admin., 666 F. Supp. 467, 467-
68 (W.D.N.Y 1987).
312. Id at 469.
313. Id. at 467.
314. Id. at 469.
315. Id. The Buffalo Court used the same language to discuss the FOIA requester's
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loan servicing records "and the information obtained from the borrower"
is that "a loan was granted by the SBA presumably on the basis of the
financial records submitted by the borrower .... [N]othing more or less
is established by the release of the requested records, much less the
contents of the records submitted by the borrowers. 316
a. SCLF Lending Records are Not 'Obtained From a Person'
The Buffalo court's reasoning is compelling because it captures the
key distinction between 'banking,' the preservation of which is the
Board's sole objective in making SCLF loans, and 'administrative'
functions incidental to Board objectives. In Foster Poultry Farms, Inc.
v. Suntrust Bank ("Foster"), 17 the court detailed the proper use of a
borrower's confidential information at each step of the loan process.
Beginning with the loan application, then origination and ultimately
servicing, the Foster decision highlights the changing nature of the same
class of information. In Foster, a business approached its bank in order
to obtain funds to acquire a competitor.3" 8 In doing so, the borrower
engaged the bank "to provide financial services" 319 Uncertainty about
the availability of this financing represents the breakdown in the
'financial intermediation' function-where banks evaluate credit risks
so buyers and sellers can go about their business-Bernanke said
exacerbated the Great Depression. If the SCLF lending supports a
functioning financial services market, capable of providing credit to
worthy borrowers, then Bernanke's SCLF lending will have
succeeded.320
The Board's interest in the Reserve Bank records has almost
nothing to do with repayment. As the Board points out, the Reserve
Banks have sole discretion to implement the SCLF lending. The
Reserve Banks extend the SCLF loans to the borrowers to advance the
Board's-and the government's-interest in a vibrant market for
argument. Id. at 468 (quoting Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Small Bus. Admin., 670
F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1982)).
316. Id. at 468-69 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
317. No. 1:04-cv-5513, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2733 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2008).
318. Id. at *16.
319. The borrower in Foster, for example, engaged its bank to provide "financial
services" in the form of: (1) arranging for additional banks to fill out participation for
the entire amount of the letter of credit; (2) to act as the issuing bank of the letter of
credit; and (3) to act as administrative agent for the credit. Id. at **9-10.
320. See supra notes 257 and 262 and accompanying text.
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financial services, not merely repayment of the loans. The Reserve
Banks report the loan details at issue to the Board to evaluate whether
the SCLF lending is having the intended effect on services and the
information about the loan details is only incidental to either the Reserve
Banks or the Board. The reports at issue here fall within the Buffalo
framework.
Necessary to the courts 'agency records' holding is a court finding
the SCLF records were either created or obtained by the Board and are
within the Board's control.321 If the court decided the Board created the
material for purposes of 'agency records,' 322 the exemption four
obtained from a person discussion can end there. If not, and the court
found the SCLF records at issue are 'obtained' from the Reserve Banks,
then the division of functions highlighted by Foster and the Board's
view of systemic risk suggest the SCLF records are obtained from the
Reserve Banks acting in a purely administrative capacity under the
reasoning in Buffalo. Accordingly, such administrative records are
obtained from the Reserve Banks incident to a government function and
are not 'obtained from a person' for purposes of exemption four.
2. Confidential
If the Fox court's view of the 'obtained from a person' issue
prevails over the Bloomberg court's holding, the appellate court's
exemption four analysis would proceed to confidentiality. Under the
widely accepted3 23 'confidentiality' standard the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals laid out in National Parks & Conservation Ass 'n v. Morton,324 a
submission is 'confidential' under exemption four if disclosure "is likely
to" either impair the government's ability to obtain necessary
information in the future or cause substantial harm to the competitive
position of the person from whom the information was obtained.
325
National Parks involved a request for disclosure of audits and other
financial materials the National Park Service required its concessioners
321. See, e.g., DOJ v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989); Kissinger v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of Press, 445 U.S. 150-51 (1980).
322. Recall the reports at issue are created internally by the Board from the Reserve
Banks' raw data. See supra text accompanying note 103.
323. But see supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing Critical Mass Energy
Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc)).
324. 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
325. Id. at 770. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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to submit. The court found the concessioners had an interest in non-
disclosure, and concluded exemption four protected their private
interests to the extent the submitters would be at a competitive
disadvantage as a result of publication. The court held the application of
exemption four could not protect the government's interests "[s]ince the
concessioners are required to provide this financial information to the
government, there is presumably no danger that public disclosure will
impair the ability of the Government to obtain this information in the
future. 326  The court then remanded for a determination of whether
disclosure would harm the interests of the submitters.
3 27
The SCLF borrowing records at issue here are not confidential
within the meaning of exemption four. First, the Board fails to prove
disclosure will result in 'substantial competitive harm' to the interests of
the submitting Reserve Bank. Second, the government's ability to
collect information from the Reserve Banks in the future will not be
impaired. Yet before these issues can be discussed, the court must
dispense with the Board's 'program effectiveness' argument.
a. Purported Program Effectiveness Prong
The Board contends a purported 'program effectiveness' prong of
the National Parks confidentiality test justifies withholding of the SCLF
records as confidential under exemption four. "[D]isclosure of borrower
names, loan amounts, and terms of individual loans would impair the
Board's ability ... to complement open market operations in achieving
target short term interest rates... relieve liquidity strains in individual
institutions and the banking system under section ... and to utilize...
lending facilities to address unusual and exigent circumstances. 328 This
argument suffers from two fatal flaws. First, the case law discussing the
'program effectiveness' prong is thin at best. Second, the evidence
raises substantial questions about whether the effectiveness of Fed
monetary policy would actually be impaired by disclosure of the SCLF
records at issue.
The Board foolishly relies329 on a footnote in National Parks3 0 to
326. National Parks, 498 F.2d at 770.
327. Id. at 770-71.
328. Fed Reply and Opposition, supra note 280, at 11 (citing Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, supra note 22, at 26-30).
329. Id. at 11-15.
330. 498 F.2d 765, 770 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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argue "program effectiveness" is the "third prong" of exemption four in
the Second Circuit. 33' Essentially, any program effectiveness argument
is grounded in the belief that "the Government should not be precluded
from invoking the protection of exemption [four] merely because the
asserted interest is not precisely one of those two identified in National
Parks [ y,332 Yet the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly
declined to adopt the 'program effectiveness' footnote of National Parks
in Nadler v. FDIC.333 The Second Circuit adopted the National Parks
formulation in Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Co. v. SEC334 which
cited to a later D.C. Circuit case, Charles River Park, Inc. v. Department
of Housing and Urban Development,335 and referenced National Parks
with a "See also., 336 The Continental Stock court goes on to refer to
"the test formulated in Charles River Park.,337 'Program effectiveness'
is certainly not the law of the Second Circuit.
The strongest holding in favor of a 'program effectiveness' prong is
the First Circuit Court of Appeals holding in 9 to 5 Organization for
Women Office Workers v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System ("9 to 5"). 33 The 9 to 5 court felt many government interests are
cognizable under exemption four.339 Exemption four protects "infor-
331. The Federal Reserve Bank says Bloomberg's argument such "program
effectiveness "is not good law in this [Second] Circuit is unfounded." Fed Reply and
Opposition, supra note 280, at 13-14.
332. 9 to 5 Organization for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1983).
333. Nadler v. FDIC, 92 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1996) (declining to "reach the issue" of
whether the scope of "other governmental interests" extends to "program effectiveness"
and affirming non-disclosure based on risk of harm to submitter).
334. 566 F.2d 373, 375 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam); but see Inner City
Press/Community on Move v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 463 F.3d 239,
244 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating "this Circuit has adopted a two-part test formulated by the
District of Columbia Circuit in National Parks").
335. 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975). While Charles River Park refers to National
Parks, it does not specifically reference National Parks footnote 17.
336. 566 F.2d at 375 (2d Cir. 1977).
337. Id.
338. 721 F.2d 1, 10-11 (lst Cir. 1983).
339. Id. at 9 (finding no limitation in National Parks "on the number of legitimate
interests which are protected by exemption 4"); accord Washington Post Co. v. U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 865 F.2d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting "[o]ther
interests may indeed be considered under exemption 4" (citing Critical Mass Energy
Project v. NRC, 830 F.2d 278, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding government interest in
administrative efficiency and effectiveness), rev'd on other grounds by 975 F.2d 871,
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mation which would be particularly helpful to agency officials in
carrying out their mandate" the 9 to 5 court noted.3 40 Specifically, the 9
to 5 court held the Boston Reserve Bank's "legitimate governmental
interest of efficient operation" 34' meant the Reserve Bank should receive
access to regional salary data it could not access under circumstances
where the information might have to be disclosed publicly.3 4' The 9 to 5
court reasoned "it would do violence to the statutory purpose of
exemption [four] were the Government to be disadvantaged by dis-
closing information which serves a valuable purpose and is useful for
the effective execution of its statutory responsibilities.
343
Those cases where courts adopt 'program effectiveness' offer far
more clear-cut cases for government efficiency in the ordinary course of
agency business, such as an employer's need for access to the salary
data at issue in 9 to 5, than the speculative economic-policy based
claims raised by the Board here. Courts have recognized the value of
maintaining the secrecy of materials submitted to the Department of
Commerce by companies hoping to obtain export licenses for use "in the
enforcement of export laws." 344 Importantly, neither 9 to 5 Women
345
879 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (offering "[n]o opinion as to whether any other governmental or
private interest might also fall within the exemption's protection"))).
340. 9 to 5 Organization for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1983).
341. Id. at 11.
342. A private organization composed of approximately 40 of the region's largest
employers compiled salary and wage data obtained from each of its members and
distributed the results of the survey to each member of the group. Members of the
organization explicitly agree to treat the salary information contained in the surveys as
confidential and to refrain from making the information available to the public.
Members who violate this pledge of confidentiality are subject to expulsion from the
group. Id. at 3.
343. Id. at 11.
344. Duman v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 777 F. Supp. 965, 967 (D.D.C. 1991)
(concluding documents, drawings, technical data, designs, formulations, blueprints,
engineering and process drawings given to the Bureau of Export Administration by a
private company seeking a license to export certain copper foil technology is "used in
the enforcement of export laws" and falls within Exemption 4). The Durnan Court
found a government explanation of the need to keep "information about technology and
entities being investigated" for use "in the enforcement of export laws" would "impair
the government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future." Id.; Africa
Fund v. Mosbacher, No. 92 Civ. 289 (JFK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7044, at *22
(S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1993) (finding disclosure would "[i]mpinge upon the agency's
receipt of substantial information that potential exporters voluntarily submit when
seeking export licenses and that the agency finds invaluable in making policy and
2009
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nor the export cases 346 based their holding squarely the application of a
three-part confidentiality test with a 'program effectiveness' prong as
the Board urges here.
347
Only a small number of cases have been decided on "program
effectiveness" grounds. The Comstock348 holding3 49 is interpreted by
some courts as a "program effectiveness" decision. As construed in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York, the Comstock
court "held that Exemption Four was available because disclosure would
impair the agency's ability to execute its statutory mandate. Commercial
banks and borrowers were reluctant to negotiate loan agreements with
the agency absent assurances of confidentiality, and the Court found that
this reluctance would interfere with the agency's ability to promote
United States exports."35 While Comstock effectively applied a "pro-
gram effectiveness" prong of National Parks, the language of the
Comstock holding has more to do with the agency's burden of proof to
justify nondisclosure than the legal proposition the evidence is offered to
prove.35'
In Public Citizen Health Research Group v. National Institutes of
maintaining effective export controls").
345. 721 F.2d at 5.
346. Durnan, 777 F. Supp. at 967 (citing Greenberg v. FDA, 803 F.2d 1213, 1216
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (applying the traditional two-part National Parks test)); Africa Fund,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7044, at *20 (describing National Parks as the "primary test"
and discussing program effectiveness as "[i]t has also been held that documents are
subject to Exemption 4 if their disclosure would undermine the agency's effective
execution of its statutory responsibilities" (internal quotations omitted) (citing 9 to 5,
721 F.2d at 11; Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C.
Cir. 1974))).
347. FRB's Reply and Opposition to Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment at 11, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 08
Civ. 9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24,
2009) (arguing "the Board properly withheld 231 pages of loan information on
individual borrowers under the so-called "third prong" or "program effectiveness"
branch of Exemption 4").
348. Comstock Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Export-Import Bank, 464 F. Supp. 804 (D.D.C.
1979).
349. Id.
350. Nadler v. FDIC, 899 F. Supp. 158, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
351. The actual holding in Comstock is found in this sentence: "The Court
concludes that the affidavits offered by Eximbank offer 'specific factual or evidentiary
material' to satisfy defendant's burden of proving that circumstances justify
nondisclosure of the loan agreement." Comstock, 464 F. Supp. at 808.
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Health ("NlIH"), 35 2 the District Court for the District of Columbia found
that "[i]mpairment of the effectiveness of a government program is a
proper factor for consideration in conducting an analysis under FOIA
exemption [four]." '3 53 At issue in NIH was a request for information
about the medical research agency's revenues from royalties based on
externally sponsored research. The request also sought information
detailing the arrangements giving rise to these royalties.354 The royalties
arose in the course of research conducted by agency employees who
work, pursuant to statute,355 at agency laboratories receiving private
funding. This arrangement, intended to lead to "inventions [of] 'early
stage technologies' that otherwise would not be further developed,"
requires the government to agree to license the invention arising out of
the collaborative research to the outside party at the outset of the project.
If the agency decides to patent an invention, it markets the invention to
commercial partners and negotiates a licensing agreement providing for
"consideration" in the form of royalties. Consistent with the program's
objectives, these "[l]icensing decisions are not simply based on who will
pay the highest royalties, but who can best develop and commercialize
the technology. 356 In overseeing litigation arising from a FOIA request
contested by a private partner of the agency, the District Court for the
District of Columbia faced a claim "the licensing program's [statutory]
effectiveness would be diminished if the information was released., 357
Reasoning the "function of commercializing invention is left up to the
private sector" by the policy and objective of one statute 358 under a
collaborative arrangement encouraged by another statute,359 the court
held "if the royalty information were disclosed, the effectiveness of
352. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Nat'l Insts. of Health, 209 F. Supp. 2d
37 (D.D.C. 2002).
353. Id. at 52 (citing Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (offering "no opinion as to whether any other governmental or private
interest might also fall within the exemption's protection").
354. Id. at 39.
355. Federal Technology Transfer Act ("FTTA"), 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (2006).
356. Nat'l Insts. of Health, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
357. Id. at 51.
358. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006) ("It is the policy and objective of the
Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from
federally supported research or development; to encourage maximum participation of
small business firms in federally supported research and development efforts; to
promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations,
including universities.").
359. 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (2006).
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Defendant's licensing program would be impaired.
3 60
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dicta in Washington Post v.
Department of Health and Human Services ("Washington Post")36'
suggests that "other interests [i.e. program effectiveness] can be
introduced into the balance only as factors weighing against disclosure"
just as National Parks "capture[d]... the most obvious interests that
Congress was seeking to protect" in exemption four, serious competitive
harm and impairment of government information-gathering.3 62  The
Washington Post court held "a genuine issue of material fact exists" as
to the impact of limited personal disclosure requirements on the
government's ability to spur participation of scientists in National
Cancer Institute peer review and research.363 The government's
argument was based, in part, on a survey of 49 consultants, out of a total
of 467, whose financial interests would be subject to disclosure. Of
those surveyed, five said they would decline to participate in the future
and an additional five had a "clear objection to disclosure," but would
still accept future service. 364 The district court conducted an exemption
four inquiry with the intent of achieving "a rough balancing of the extent
of impairment and the importance of the information against the public
interest in disclosure. '' 365 By expressly finding "the extent of the
government's impairment [if the scientists' financial information were to
be disclosed] and the importance of the information [provided by the
scientists] outweigh the public interest in disclosure,, 366 the district
court improperly 367  "reinject[ed] the potential risk of [scientist]
nonparticipation into the [exemption four] inquiry. 368
360. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Nat'l Insts. of Health, 209 F. Supp. 2d
37, 52 (D.D.C. 2002).
361. Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 865 F.2d 320
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
362. Id. at 327.
363. Id. at 321 (finding summary judgment inappropriate).
364. Id. at 323.
365. Id. at 323 n.4 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
366. Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 865 F.2d 320,
324 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted).
367. The district court thought such a factor "to be proper under the exemption 4
'confidentiality' analysis." Id. at 323.
368. Id. "In performing that balance, we caution that in this case, there is no longer
any room on the scales for weighing the possibility that public disclosure... will cause
some scientists to decline service on the NCI's peer review committees altogether.
Whatever validity this contention of 'nonparticipation' might have . . . if similar
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Importantly, the appellate court criticized the district court for
allowing "the risk of future scientist nonparticipation to diminish the
overall public interest in disclosure that would be balanced against
the negative factors. Such an approach could not have been intended
by the drafters of exemption 4 for it would allow courts to count
anti-disclosure factors on both sides of the scale, adding weight to
the impairment side and reducing the weight on the disclosure side.
The thrust of FOIA is distinctly in the opposite direction, and
exemption 4 contemplates a straightforward balance of the pros and
the cons of disclosure in any particular case.
36 9
Washington Post is not an ideal case to cite for those arguing in
favor of exemption four, even those seeking the benefit of its dicta37°
suggesting other interests can be incorporated in a National Parks
analysis, because the case requires courts to conduct legitimate factual
inquiries into the basis for FOIA exemption four and significantly
narrowed the possibility of any of the National Parks considerations
serving as a basis for nondisclosure to situations "when the affirmative
interests in disclosure on the one side are outweighed by the factors
identified in National Parks (and its progeny) militating against
disclosure on the other side. More simply put, 'minor' disadvantages
flowing from disclosure 'cannot overcome the disclosure mandate of
FOIA.'"5371
Given the rejection of 'program effectiveness' by the Nadler court
in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals tepid response to similar arguments in Washington Post,
'program effectiveness' is not sufficiently well established to justify
nondisclosure here.
litigation were commenced in the future... for the purpose of this action the issue of
nonparticipation was waived by the government when it abandoned the claim before
this court. Id. at 327 (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 268 n.51
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting the court did not address the government's need to attract
qualified scientists because the government did not raise "that specific interest in the
National Parks I test")).
369. Id. at 327-28.
370. The court did not actually issue a holding on "program effectiveness," but
remanded for development of a more complete factual record. Id. at 328.
371. Id. at 327 (quoting Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
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b. Substantial Competitive Harm
If the court's analysis proceeds to 'confidentiality' under exemption
four, the Board's 'agency records' argument will have failed but its
'obtained from a person test' arguments will have prevailed. As a result,
the 'substantial competitive harm' inquiry will view the 'submitter' as
either the Reserve Bank or the SCLF borrower. This prong of the
National Parks test protects the interests of the submitter, so the court's
view of the applicable submitter assumes particular importance. To
prove disclosure has the potential to subject the submitter to the risk of
'substantial competitive harm' under exemption four, "a party need only
demonstrate the existence of actual competition and the likelihood of
substantial competitive injury. 3 7 2  "[T]he important point for com-
petitive harm in the FOIA context . . . is that it be limited to harm
flowing from the affirmative use of proprietary information by
competitors. 373 An analysis of the 'substantial competitive harm' to
the submitter under each scenario, Reserve Bank or SCLF borrower,
follows in turn.
i. Harm to Reserve Banks
This argument can be put to rest by citing to the statutory authority
for the Fed's SCLF lending. Because the records at issue involve SCLF
lending records, the applicable 'competitive harm' inquiry should focus
on the market to serve as 'lender of last resort.' Yet FRA § 13(3)
requires a showing the SCLF borrower is "unable to secure adequate
credit accommodations from other banking institutions. 374 The Reserve
Banks simply cannot face competition to serve as 'lenders of last resort.'
Substantial competitive harm to a government agency competing in
the private market can arise in the absence of competition with the
government agency only in very rare situations. In NIH the court was
confronted with such circumstances. There, despite a few notable
exceptions where it was "extremely competitive" to partner with the
agency, the applicable market of private sector entities competing to
372. Gulf& W. Indus. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
373. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Nat'l Insts. of Health, 209 F. Supp. 2d
37, 47 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d
1280, 1291 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
374. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
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fulfill the agency's objectives regularly operated with only one
interested participant. 75 The court found disclosure would result in "a
diminution in the number of [private] firms willing to engage in
partnership"376 with the agency, which "would cease to be an attractive
or viable licensor of patented technology. 377 As a result, the court held
the agency "substantially demonstrated that the effectiveness of the
[agency's] licensingprogram would be critically impaired" by
disclosure.378
The NIH circumstances are somewhat analogous to those at issue
here. Evidence even teetering institutions in serious need of cash would
turn to alternatives to the Reserve Banks indicates competition in the
market for distressed lending, but not to provide the § 13(3) lender of
last resort function the SCLFs are supposed to fill.3 79 Unlike the facts in
NIH, where the government was competing to attract firms to fulfill its
objectives, the nature of SCLF lending means competition to provide the
13(3) lending at issue is nonexistent.
Disclosure of SCLF borrowing might make it more difficult for the
Reserve Banks to coax institutions with other options into tapping the
SCLFs. Disclosure might, as the New York Fed's President William
Dudley fears, "undermine the value of the facilities that [the New York
Fed is] providing., 380 Perhaps it will be more difficult for the Fed to
achieve FOMC and Board liquidity and interest rate objectives.38'
Maybe banks will be reluctant to borrow from the Fed in a liquidity
crunch.382 These justifications are insufficient to prove 'substantial
competitive harm' to the Reserve Banks required here. First, as
established, any 'competitive harm' does not occur in the applicable
market: §13(3) lending. Second, the Fed has a variety of tools other
than SCLF lending at its disposal, in particular FOMC operations. Even
if disclosure were to entirely destroy the utility of SCLF lending, the Fed
is not driven 'out of the business' of injecting liquidity into financial
markets or institutions. For these reasons the Reserve Banks do not
suffer 'substantial competitive harm' as a result of disclosure.
375. Nat 'l Insts. of Health, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 54.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 53.
378. Id. at 54.
379. See supra text accompanying note 28.
380. See supra text accompanying note 101.
381. See supra text accompanying note 328.
382. See supra text accompanying note 235.
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ii. Harm To SCLF Borrowers
The Fed's borrowers are hardly subject to substantial competitive
harm by borrowing at favorable rates, 383 maintaining liquidity when
none is otherwise available, and staying in business. If claims the claims
at issue in Buffalo, that small businesses "will reject the low interest
loans sponsored by the [Small Business Administration ("SBA")] on a
wholesale basis [are] of questionable legitimacy on its face and [are]
wholly unsupported by any evidence submitted by the SBA, ' 314 than
similar claims in relation to the Board's too big to fail institutions are
preposterous. In Buffalo the court found "[t]here is virtually no equiv-
alent alternative source for the type of low cost debt financing one is
able to obtain from the SBA ' 385 for small businesses.
Similarly, here there is no equivalent alternative source of low cost
debt financing that the world's largest banks can obtain from the Fed.
Goldman Sachs paid dearly, especially compared to Paulson's Treasury,
for its 2008 cash infusion from Warren Buffet. 386 Importantly, the
Buffet investment did not come until two days after Goldman converted
to a bank holding company, putting a wider variety of Fed SCLFs within
Goldman's reach.387 Similarly, Citibank made concessions considered
significant at the time in exchange for a substantial cash infusion in
2007.388 These examples demonstrate the reality of the marketplace
383. See, e.g., Mark Gongloff, Banks Profit from U.S. Guarantee, WALL ST. J., July
27, 2009, at C1.
384. Buffalo Evening News, Inc. v. Small Bus. Admin., 666 F. Supp. 467, 471
(W.D.N.Y. 1987) (internal citations omitted) (rejecting claims disclosure would harm
the SBA's ability to conduct its own business as intended by Congress). The court also
held the SBA failed to establish the likelihood of competitive injury to its borrowers as
required by National Parks. The court held a class of SBA documents was not
"privileged or confidential" within the meaning of Exemption 4. Id.
385. Id.
386. 'Distasteful' Capital, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2008, at A18 (arguing terms of
Treasury's TARP infusions are "somewhat more generous to the banks than outside
investors such as Warren Buffett have recently demanded"); John Paulson, The Public
Deserves a Better Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A 19.
387. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins Jr., The Weekend Interview with Lloyd Blankfein:
The Bank Everyone Loves to Hate, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2009, at A 13 (recounting
"[t]he firm sped up ... [its] application before the Fed to become a bank holding
company .... Two days later, [the firm] raised $5 billion from Warren Buffett .... ).
388. Citi of Arabia, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2007, at A18 (arguing "[g]iven the 11%
the bank is paying Abu Dhabi, Citigroup's other equity holders might also be better off
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when §13(3) SCLFs are under consideration: private capital is either
nonexistent, prohibitively costly or, at the least, available on terms
which are significantly less favorable than those available from a Fed
SCLF.
Where 'systemic risk' is truly an issue, banks will tap the SCLFs in
spite of any concerns about stigma because it is the only way to ensure
their survival. If faced with a stark choice between a bank run financed
or tempered by the Fed's SCLFs and a humiliating bank failure,389 no
sane bank executive-the submitter whose confidentiality interests are
protected by exemption four in this context-would choose the latter.
The events of the past year prove the point. At the beginning of 2008,
the competitive landscape for publicly traded investment banks,390 the
applicable market for many SCLF borrowers,39' was comprised of five
firms. Two, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, were unable to borrow
from the Fed during the market panic392 and failed. A third firm, Merrill
Lynch, merged to avoid the same fate as Lehman.3 93 The two remaining
firms, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, survived and have returned
to profitability.3 94 Fed borrowing, meanwhile, is arguably now cor-
related with success instead of stigma.3 95 No economic actor is exposed
to the risk of 'substantial competitive harm' by disclosure of their
willingness to take a risk free profit by reinvesting the proceeds of dirt
down the road had they taken a dividend cut instead").
389. Lehman Brothers former chief executive officer, Richard Fuld, Jr., lost a
personal fortune when his firm filed for bankruptcy in September of 2008. Fuld now
spends his days dealing with Lehman-related litigation and struggles to secure clients at
the small boutique he recently started with two assistants and an aide. Susanne Craig &
Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, From Lehman's Wreckage, New Lives, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12,
2009, at Al. Lehman's failure put Fuld and the rest of Lehman's staff at a competitive
disadvantage in the investment banking marketplace.
390. Here, the market was arguably defined as independent investment banks
unburdened by large commercial banking operations. At the beginning of 2008, the
leading such firms were Bear Steams, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch, and Morgan Stanley.
391. Many SCLF programs, such as the PDCF and TSLF discussed supra at note 32,
are explicitly targeted at the investment banking industry.
392. See KELLY, supra note 44 (discussing Bear Steams liquidity problems and the
creation of Fed facilities after the Bear's failure); James Stewart, supra note 29
(describing Lehman's woes and apparent inability to post sufficient collateral for a Fed
loan).
393. See Stewart, supra note 29.
394. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 387.
395. See supra text accompanying note 100.
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cheap Fed loans in highly rated government securities. Profits attrib-
utable to the Fed's lending are windfalls in the purest sense.39 6 The
ultimate 'substantial competitive harm' faced by large firms amidst the
2008 financial crisis-failure-resulted from financial firms inability to
borrow from the Fed. 9
c. Impairment of Government's Ability to Collect Information
The impairment prong of the National Parks confidentiality test is
concerned with the quality of information submitted to the government.
In Inner City Press/Community on the Move v. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System ("Inner City Press"), 39s the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the National Parks' presumption against
impairment in the case of information submitted on a compulsory
basis 399 to a FOIA request for the disclosure of a bank's customer list.400
The court held "an agency must both possess and exercise the legal
authority to obtain information for the resulting submission of
information to be deemed 'mandatory."' 40 ' Because the Board "did not
exercise any authority to compel" or make a separate request for the
bank's customer list, the court found the bank voluntarily submitted the
396. See Simon Nixon, Windfalls Show That Bonus Tax Makes Sense, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 20, 2009, at C10.
397. Both Wessel and Stewart discuss the role Paulson's public vow not to put
forward public money for Lehman Brothers played in the firms downfall. WESSEL,
supra note 12; Stewart, supra note 29.
398. 463 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2006).
399. "If a person is compelled to submit information ... there is presumably no
danger that public disclosure will impair the ability of the Government to obtain the
information in the future." Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 245 (quoting Nat'l Parks &
Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (internal quotations
and marks omitted)).
400. The immediate issue on appeal was whether exemption four applied to the
names of an acquiring bank's "customers that engage in subprime lending." Id. at 243.
The requesters originally sought specific terms and amounts of credit extended under
loans to, as well as descriptions of other services provided for, these subprime lending
customers by the acquiring bank. This information comprised a "Confidential Exhibit"
submitted to the FRB in connection with a bank merger application. The FRB's
approval of the merger was required under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA),
12 U.S.C. § 1842 (2006). Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 242-43.
401. Inner City Press, 463 F.3d at 247-48 (outlining the definition of "mandatory"
under the National Parks test).
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information to the Board.4 °2 The requested information was held
confidential under the 'impairment' prong.40 3 In National Parks the
mandatory nature of the submission meant the court could not deem the
impairment prong was implicated. The Inner City Press decision
reflected the court's reluctance-shared by the Critical Mass court-to
dictate the Board's approach to gathering information 40 4 or set a
standard likely to diminish the quality of information submitted on a
mandatory basis.40 5
The government's ability to collect information in the future is not
impaired by non-participation of private parties in a government activity
even when such participation furthers government objectives. In
Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
("Washington Post") 406 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held the
government's fear "qualified [scientists who consult for the National
Cancer Institute40 7] might forego participation in the peer review process
altogether if their listing of financial interests were made publicly
available" was "irrelevant to the question of 'impairment'-that is, to
402. The Board's request was "'too amorphous' to be considered a demand." Id. at
248 (agreeing with the District Court's finding the FRB "did not compel" the bank's
submission in the case). The court noted the Board's regulatory enabling statutes
allowed the FRB to request "some information" from the bank and similar institutions,
but found "it is unclear whether the Board is permitted to compel specific information
such as client lists." Id. at 246 n.7. The court explicitly rejected the notion that "mere
legal authority to compel the production of information .. . is sufficient for that
submission of information to be deemed mandatory" out of concern such a "standard
would result in an undesirable general presumption against impairment." Id. at 246-47
403. Id. at 248.
404. Compare Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir.
1992) ("[N]o provision in FOIA . .. obliges agencies to exercise their regulatory
authority in a manner that will maximize the amount of information that will be made
available to the public."), with Inner City Press/Community on the Move v. Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 463 F.3d 239, 247 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting same
Critical Mass language to support its finding there is "no reason for interfering with the
government's discretion as to how to exercise its regulatory authority to collect
necessary information").
405. Compare Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878 ("[d]ealing with a FOIA request for
information the provider is required to supply, the governmental impact inquiry will
focus on the possible effect of disclosure on its quality"), with Inner City Press, 463
F.3d at 247 (fearing bank's knowledge their information might be subject to disclosure
is likely to deter submissions and make them more "likely submit the bare minimum
required").
406. 865 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
407. Id. at 321 (discussing background).
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whether those scientists who do become involved with NCI committees
will narrowly construe the financial disclosure requests. 40 8 Washington
Post was a precursor to Critical Mass and informed the D.C. Circuit's
reasoning "there are circumstances in which disclosure could affect the
reliability of such data., 40 9  This is because the interest in gathering
information within the National Parks test involves only the reliability
and provision of the information itself. Impairment of participation in
the activity giving rise to the information collection is simply not
impairment of the government's information collection objectives.
C. Exemption Five
If the Board's arguments under both 'agency records' and
exemption four fail, the Board makes a last ditch effort to salvage its
secrecy under exemption five. In the seminal case regarding the Fed's
monetary policy disclosure obligations, Fed. Open Market Comm. of
Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill (Merrill"),10 the Supreme Court held that
instructions 411 to the New York Fed account manager charged with
408. Id. at 323. The Court did find "[t]he issue of whether disclosure of the
financial information ... would seriously impair the government's ability to gather the
information it needs from participating scientists in the future is a disputed factual issue
that does not lend itself to disposition by means of summary judgment on the present
record." Id. at 328.
409. Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(citing Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252,
268-69 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discussing possible effect of disclosure on accuracy of
statements filed by consultants)).
410. 443 U.S. 340 (1979).
411. The document, referred to as a "Domestic Policy Directive," indicated "in
general terms" whether the FOMC wished to follow an expansionary, deflationary, or
unchanged monetary policy in the period ahead." Id. at 344-45. "[G]eneral phrases"
were the "operative language" of the DPDs, which also included "specific tolerance
ranges for the growth in the money supply and for the federal funds rate." Id. at n.6.
To implement this authority, the FOMC's "combined investment pool for all Federal
Reserve banks, known as the System Open Market Account" ("SOMA") carried out
open market operations on behalf of the Federal Reserve System. The SOMA was
directed by a senior officer of the New York Fed, who serves as an "Account Manager,"
id. at 345, and is "guided" in the "day-to-day operations" of the SOMA by the DPD and
a daily conference call with FOMC staff and at least one FOMC member. Id. at 346.
"Subject to this oversight, the Manager has broad discretion in implementing the
Committee's policy." Id. The policy is carried out in "open market operations" ordered
and directed by SOMA account managers through trades with dealers in United States
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carrying out the FOMC's open market operations412 could be released
with "a slight delay" if the District Court concluded that "immediate
release . . . would significantly harm the government's monetary
functions or commercial interests. 413  The scope of the holding was
limited. The Court did "not consider whether, or to what extent" 414 the
monetary policy directives at issue would qualify as "inter-agency or
intra-agency memorandums, 41 5 exempt from disclosure under FOIA's
exemption five even though the information "can fairly be described as
containing confidential commercial information generated in the process
of awarding a contract., 416 Expanding on the Court's statement in EPA
v. Mink, where the Court observed "the discovery rules can only be
applied under Exemption 5 by way of rough analogies, 417 the Merrill
Court held that "the sensitivity of the commercial secrets involved, and
the harm that would be inflicted upon the Government by premature
disclosure, should continue to serve as relevant criteria in determining
Government and federal agency securities (i.e. bond traders). Id. This is substantially
the same today, although the Fed now typically releases the target range after the
meeting and minutes, along with the DPD, three weeks later. See, e.g., Press Release,
Federal Reserve Bank, FOMC Statement (June 24, 2009) (stating the FOMC "will
maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and continues to
anticipate that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the
federal funds rate for an extended period"), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/monetary/20090624a.htm; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, June 23-24, 2009 (noting
"[t]he release of the April FOMC minutes three weeks later prompted a reversal of' a
market trend towards rising Treasury yields "as market participants reportedly focused
on" a policy suggestion revealed in the minutes about possible future adjustments to the
size of a FOMC initiative), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
fomcminutes20090624.htm.
412. By purchasing securities on the Fed's behalf, the total volume of commercial
bank reserves is increased, spurring additional lending and investment while driving
down interest rates. The FOMC purchases securities to stimulate spending and invest-
ment in the economy. The opposite is true when the Fed sells securities, and the money
supply tightens. Merrill v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of Fed. Reserve Sys., 565 F.2d 778,
781 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
413. Merrill, 443 U.S. at 363 (holding exemption 5 would be applicable). The Court
found "the District Court made no findings about the impact of immediate disclosure of
the Domestic Policy Directives and tolerance ranges." Id.
414. Id. at 364.
415. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006 & 2009 Supp.).
416. Fed. Open Market Comm. of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362
(1979).
417. Id. (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973)).
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the applicability of this Exemption 5 privilege" 418 and remanded the case
to the District Court with instructions to determine if the materials "are
protected against immediate disclosure in the civil discovery process., 4 19
Here, the Board asserts a Merrill privilege "analogous to the
qualified privilege for confidential commercial information available in
civil discovery .... ,,420 The Board says this Merrill privilege protects
"'sensitive information not otherwise available ... immediate release of
[which] would significantly harm the Government's monetary
functions or commercial interests. . ,,4. In fact, any Merrill
exemption is temporary 422 and limited to "confidential commercial
information generated in the process of awarding a contract., 423
1. Exemption Five is No Longer Applicable
Exemption Five does not last forever. At a minimum, the
exemption five privilege "applies only as long as the harm from
disclosure exists. 424 The Board tactfully says it is "difficult to pinpoint
such a date with certainty, ' 42 5 but Bloomberg426 and FOX4 27 can be
418. Id. at 363.
419. Id. at 362.
420. Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 08 Civ.
9595 (LAP), 2009 WL 2599336, at *15, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942, at *49
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009).
421. Id. at *15, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942, at **49-50.
422. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion of Summary Judgment and in
Support of Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 39, Bloomberg L.P. v.
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 08 Civ. 9595 (LAP), 2009 WL
2599336, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74942 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Law in Opposition].
423. Fed. Open Market Comm. of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 360
(1979).
424. Fed Reply and Opposition, supra note 280, at 24 (citing Merrill, 443 U.S. at
360); Memorandum of Law in Opposition, supra note 422, at 39.
425. Fed Reply and Opposition, supra note 280, at 24.
426. "The Board . . . seeks to keep secret, indefinitely, all aspects of the Loan
Records and the Bear Records." Memorandum of Law in Opposition, supra note 422,
at 39.
427. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Fox News Network's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 20, Fox News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 639 F. Supp. 2d 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (arguing "[a] fortiori, this Court
should reject the Board's attempt to rely upon Exemption 5 in this case, which seeks to
justify withholding disclosure indefinitely").
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forgiven if they think that the Board intends to assert the exemption five
privilege indefinitely. The Board initially cited Government Land Bank
v. General Services Administration428 and Hack v. Department of
Energy429 to support the proposition that "Exemption 5 'protects the
government when it enters the marketplace as an ordinary buyer or
seller."' 430 Yet both of these cases "involve situations where the agency
requested a slight delay in the release of a very limited information
because the agency was acting in the short term to complete a discrete
task based on the information. 431
The exemption five issue is somewhat settled by Merrill. It was
applicable, but disclosure is required as soon as the threat abates. The
same reasons exemption four fails under the impairment prong, the
absence of immediate systemic risk, mean exemption five is not
applicable as soon as the SCLF borrower has tapped the facility and
bolstered its finances.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Board's arguments for nondisclosure are a distraction from the
elemental difference between an 'agency record' an a private
commercial record. Court-ordered disclosure of financial information
within the control of private parties is generally intended to ensure that
the benefit of the information accrues to its rightful owners.432
Disclosure is deemed problematic in the commercial context when
premature or unauthorized disclosure destroys "any potential unrealized
value" of a secret "which otherwise could and would have been kept
428. 671 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1982).
429. 538 F. Supp. 1098 (D.D.C. 1982).
430. Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 22, at 32 (citing Gov't
Land Bank v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 671 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1982)).
431. Memorandum of Law in Opposition, supra note 422, at 39 (citing Gov't Land
Bank v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 671 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1982); Hack v. U.S. Dep't of
Energy, 538 F. Supp. 1098 (D.D.C. 1982)).
432. C.f In re Ivan F. Boesky Securs. Litig., 36 F.3d 255, 261 (2d Cir. 1994). In
Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., the Court held a civil cause of
action lied where another party's misappropriation of the plaintiffs information
actually cost the plaintiff money. 967 F.2d 742, 749 (2d Cir. 1992). A "necessary
element of the Litton decision" is "[d]isclosure in the absence of a duty to disclose
caused the benefit of the information to pass" from "its rightful owners." In re Boesky,
36 F.3d at 261.
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confidential indefinitely., 433  Nondisclosure in an active marketplace,
however, often serves nefarious purposes and "is usually essential to the
success of a manipulative scheme., 43 4 In the public sector, by contrast,
many presume only "[g]overnment agencies whose mistakes cannot bear
public scrutiny have found 'good cause' for secrecy., 435 Court-ordered
disclosure of federal government agency records is a means for citizens
to know "what their Government is up to" and its "central purpose is to
ensure that the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of
public scrutiny., 436 The Board-directed SCLF lending is a government
operation and should be subject to public scrutiny under the FOIA. The
FOIA affords limited protection from disclosure of 'agency records'
under specifically enumerated exemptions. As of now the FOIA does
not recognize a Board 'systemic risk' exemption, so the Board grasps for
straws like the 'agency records' or 'obtained from a person' arguments
in the hopes of contravening the FOIA rationale. It is the prerogative of
Congress, not Board attorneys and pliable courts, to decide whether the
FRB's SCLF lending should be treated differently under the FOIA.43 v
The FOIA is intended to serve as a check on unaccountable
433. In re Boesky, 36 F.3d at 263 (quoting FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 825 F. Supp. 623,
636 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). The Boesky Court held a party with "no legitimate interest in
keeping its financial projections confidential" to the detriment of its public shareholders
precludes a finding of injury as a result of premature disclosure. Id.
434. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977). "'Manipulation' is
'virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets' and "refers
generally to practices ... intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market
activity." Id. at 476 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 199 (1976)).
435. News-Press v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 1173, 1190 (1lth Cir.
2007) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 27 (1966)).
436. DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 774 (1989)
(emphasis added). The Court in Reporters Committee held the "public interest in
providing interested citizens with answers to their questions about," id. at 775, the
criminal records of members of a family comprised of individuals allegedly tied to
organized crime who controlled a "legitimate business [which] allegedly had obtained a
number of defense contracts as a result of an improper arrangement with a corrupt
Congressman," id. at 757, "falls outside the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA
was enacted to serve." Id. at 775. The court explained it never found it "appropriate"
to construe FOIA to order a Government agency to honor a request "for information
about a particular private citizen," id. at 774-75, because FOIA was not intended to
compel disclosure of "information about private citizens that happens to be in the
warehouse of the Government." Id. at 774.
437. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n,
532 U.S. 1, 15 (2001) (declining to "read an 'Indian trust' exemption into the" FOIA).
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government activities and the Fed is a check against economic ruin. The
balance is delicate, and a healthy legal analysis of the Fed's disclosure
obligations would keep in mind the words of Carter Glass, the father of
the Fed:
I distinctly am not appealing to the prejudice against great bankers.
No man worthy to be a representative of the American people ought
to deal with a problem of such magnitude without feeling profoundly
the obligation to be fair and just to every interest involved. But so
should the big bankers deal with us.
43 8
Some unifying themes emerge from FOIA jurisprudence. The first
is that the law is generally indifferent to the motives of the FOIA
requester or the withholding agency. Here, however, the Fed is
mounting a fact and economics intensive defense of nondisclosure in
which circumstances are likely to play a greater role than they otherwise
would. Second, FOIA is generally construed in favor of disclosure and
the exemptions are actually quite narrow. The Fed's arguments straddle
so many lines and the present dispute is so unique that the value of legal
precedent is limited. As the agency records argument is unlikely to
stand on facts or law and the parties essentially agree exemption five is
applicable but disagree about its duration, the argument really comes
down to exemption four. The Board's nondisclosure of SCLF lending
should fail under exemption four because the systemic risk and stigma
arguments are too speculative.
The Special Inspector General of TARP correctly concluded that
disclosure should be the rule:
Notwithstanding the Federal Reserve's warnings, the sky did not fall;
there is no indication that AIG's disclosure undermined the stability
of AIG or the market or damaged legitimate interests of the
counterparties. The lesson that should be learned . . . is that the
default position, whenever government funds are deployed in a crisis
to support markets or institutions, should be that the public is
entitled to know what is being done with Government funds. 43
438. RIXEY SMITH & NORMAN BEASLEY, CARTER GLASS: A BIOGRAPHY 455 (Ayer
Publ'g 1970) (1939).
439. SIGTARP, supra note 5 at 31; see also Richard Teitelbaum & Hugh Son,
BLOOMBERG, New York Fed's Secret Choice to Pay for Swaps Hits Taxpayers, Oct. 27,
2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a7T5HaOgYHpE
(former St. Louis Fed president, William Poole: "[t]here should be a high bar against
not disclosing. The taxpayer has every right to understand in detail what happened.").
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